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RIGHTS RESURGENCE: THE IMPACT OF THE
ADA AMENDMENTS ACT ON SCHOOLS AND
UNIVERSITIES
Wendy F. Hensel*
Few people would have predicted that 2008 would be the year
disability rights made a comeback in the United States. For years,
courts had taken an increasingly restrictive approach to defining
disability under the Americans with Disabilities Act,1 denying class
membership to many who typically would be considered “disabled”
within the common understanding of that term.2 Although attempts to
amend the ADA had been made, none had yet gained sufficient
political traction in the legislature.3 Many predicted more of the legal
status quo, with few opportunities for plaintiffs to survive summary
judgment.4
In this case, however, the conventional wisdom proved wrong. On
September 25, 2008, President George W. Bush signed the
unanimously enacted Americans with Disabilities Amendments Act
(ADAAA)5 into law, “reinstating a broad scope of protection” to
* Associate Professor of Law, Georgia State University College of Law. The author would like to
thank Paul Lombardo, Mark Weber and Rob Garda for their very helpful comments on earlier drafts of
this article.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006).
2. See, e.g., Littleton v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 05-12770, 2007 WL 1379986, at *2 (11th Cir.
May 11, 2007) (mental retardation); Orr v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 297 F.3d 720, 724 (8th Cir. 2002)
(diabetes); Pimental v. Dartmouth-Hitchcock Clinic, 236 F. Supp. 2d 177, 184 (D.N.H. 2002) (cancer);
Todd v. Academy Corp., 57 F. Supp. 2d 448, 452 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (epilepsy).
3. See, e.g., ADA Restoration Act of 2007, H.R. 3195, 110th Cong. § 4 (2007); Americans with
Disabilities Act Restoration Act of 2006, H.R. 6258, 109th Cong. § 3 (2006). For a general discussion of
the political climate in which these bills were introduced, see, for example, Jill C. Anderson, Just
Semantics: The Lost Readings of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 117 YALE L.J. 992, 996–97
(2008); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The New Congress and the ADA, Disability Law Blog,
http://disabilitylaw.blogspot.com/2006_11_01_archive.html (Nov. 29, 2006, 09:29 EST).
4. See, e.g., Alex B. Long, Introducing the New and Improved Americans with Disabilities Act:
Assessing the ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 103 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 217, 229 (2008) (noting
“the skepticism of some (myself included) that Congress would enact any meaningful changes to the
ADA in the near term”). See also John W. Parry, 1999 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title ISurvey Update, 24 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 348, 348 (2000) (study finding that
employers win 95.7% of ADA Title I cases at the federal appellate level).
5. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.110-325, 122 Stat. 3553.
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people with disabilities.6 As a result of this largely unanticipated
development, there is a renewed sense of hope and optimism among
people with disabilities and their advocates that has long been
absent.7
With change, however, comes uncertainty and concerns with legal
compliance. The Amendments, which became effective on January 1,
2009,8 unquestionably will impact the field of education both with
respect to employment and the eligibility and accommodation of K12 and university students with disabilities. Although it is difficult in
the early days of legislation to predict the nuances that ultimately will
materialize in the law, this Article provides an early look at the
emerging legal issues for schools and universities occasioned by
passage of the ADAAA. Part I provides a brief general overview of
judicial interpretation of the disability definition prior to the
enactment of the Amendments. Part II evaluates the revised law,
exploring the specific provisions of the statute that have changed and
the public impetus behind these changes. Finally, Part III explores the
Amendments’ likely impact on schools and universities, highlighting
issues that will require further discussion in the future.
I. THE ORIGINAL ADA: JUDICIAL BACKLASH
When Congress passed the original Americans with Disabilities
Act in 1990, disability advocates hailed the legislation as a
substantial step towards ending discrimination against the millions of
Americans who will experience physical or mental impairments

6. See id. § 2(b)(1).
7. See, e.g., CHADD, President Signs ADA Amendments Act Into Law,
http://www.chadd.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Press_Releases1&TEMPLATE=/CM/HTMLDisplay
.cfm&CONTENTID=7522 (last visited Mar. 8, 2009) (calling the ADAAA’s passage “a huge victory”
and “historic”); and Posting of Advocacy to NAD Advocacy Blog, http://blogs.nad.org/advocacy/2008/
09/25/nad-celebrates-as-%E2%80%9Cada-amendments-act%E2%80%9D-becomes-law/ (Sept. 25,
2008).
8. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.110-325, § 8, 122 Stat. 3553.
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during their lifetime.9 Few anticipated that significant judicial
resistance to the legislation would quickly curtail its effectiveness.
Because disability is a social construct defined by law rather than
an immutable characteristic,10 the legal definition of disability
determines coverage under the statute. Changes in the definition or
the interpretation of its foundational components can significantly
expand or contract the class protected by law. The ADA defines
disability as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
a major life activity.11 Plaintiffs who can establish that they have an
actual disability, a record of disability, or are regarded as having a
disability all fall within the law’s anti-discrimination mandate.12 The
following discussion briefly considers the judicial and regulatory
treatment of these terms that set the stage for the Amendments.
Although much of this discussion relates to the treatment of disability
in an employment context, it is equally applicable to school and
university obligations under Titles II and III because all sections of
the ADA rely on the same statutory definition of disability.13
A. Questionable Regulatory Authority
Congress gave authority to three federal agencies to promulgate
regulations under the ADA: the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) (Title I); the Department of Justice (DOJ)
9. See, e.g., Susan Stefan, Delusions of Rights: Americans with Psychiatric Disabilities,
Employment Discrimination and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 52 ALA. L. REV. 271, 271 (2000)
(“When President Bush signed the Americans with Disabilities Act in the Rose Garden among hundreds
of people with disabilities, the mood was one of tremendous hope and triumph.”).
10. See, e.g., Wendy F. Hensel, The Disability Dilemma: A Skeptical Bench & Bar, 69 U. PITT. L.
REV. 637, 641–42 (2008) (explaining the social model of disability).
11. 42 U.S.C § 12102(2)(A) (2006).
12. 42 U.S.C § 12102(2)(A)–(C) (2006); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1)–(3) (2008). Individuals
challenging the legality of medical inquiries and examinations under the ADA do not need to establish
that they are disabled within the meaning of the law. 42 U.S.C § 12112(d) (2006).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006). It is worth noting, however, that some scholars have challenged the
extent to which Title I cases and theory are applicable to Titles II and III. See, e.g., Michael Waterstone,
The Untold Story of the Rest of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1807, 1810
(2005) (finding that “Title II and III cases have had more pro-plaintiff results than Title I” cases and
concluding “the Title I explanation and suggestions [by scholars] are to varying degrees incomplete or
inaccurate when applied to the ADA’s non-employment Titles”).
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(Titles II & III); and the Department of Transportation (DOT)
(transportation services under Titles II & III).14 Each of these
agencies has issued regulations interpreting the definition of
disability.15 Pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act, these
regulations would ordinarily be entitled to deference by courts,
provided that the agencies followed the appropriate procedures in
adopting them and the agency’s interpretation constituted a
reasonable exercise of the delegated authority.16 The Supreme Court,
however, called the EEOC’s authority to promulgate such regulations
into question in Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.,17 because the
definition of disability is located in the General Provisions section of
the ADA rather than in any of the subsequent Titles.18 Because
Congress gave no agency the authority to promulgate regulations
relating to the General Provisions, the Court voiced skepticism that
the regulations were entitled to any deference by the courts.19
Despite its misgivings, the Supreme Court never definitely
determined what weight to give to the regulations because the parties
in Sutton did not dispute their legitimacy.20 In subsequent decisions,
however, the Court defined “substantial limitation” and “major life
activity” in ways that seemingly conflicted with EEOC regulations,
establishing more exacting standards for plaintiffs.21 Although the
impact of the Court’s skepticism has been limited to some extent by
14. 42 U.S.C. § 12116 (2006) (Title I – EEOC); 42 U.S.C. § 12134(a) (2006) (Title II – DOJ); 42
U.S.C. § 12149(a) (2006) (Title II – DOT); 42 U.S.C. § 12186(a)(1), (b) (2006) (Title III – DOT and
DOJ, respectively).
15. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (2008) (Title I – EEOC); 28 C.F.R. § 35.104 (2008) (Title II –
DOJ); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2008) (Title III – DOJ); 49 C.F.R. § 37.3 (2008) (Title II and III – DOT).
16. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006) (describing formal rule making process under the Administrative
Procedure Act). See also Lisa Eichhorn, The Chevron Two-Step and the Toyota Sidestep: Dancing
Around the EEOC’s “Disability” Regulations Under the ADA, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 177, 189–91
(2004) (explaining the deference attached to regulations).
17. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 478 (1999).
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (2006) (defining disability); Sutton, 527 U.S. at 478.
19. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 479. Notably, this position seemingly conflicts with that taken in Bragdon v.
Abbot, 524 U.S. 624, 646 (1998), where the Court stated that Title III regulations issued by DOJ,
implicitly including those relating to the disability definition, were entitled to deference. Id.
20. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 480.
21. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002). See also infra Part I.C.
(discussing interpretation of the substantial limitation requirement).
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lower courts’ continued deference to the regulations,22 the Sutton
decision clearly created the potential for a restrictive definition of
disability and broad judicial discretion unchecked by regulatory
guidance.
B. “Major Life Activity”23
The text of the ADA provides no insight into the meaning of major
life activity. Accordingly, the parameters of this term have been
flushed out exclusively by regulatory and judicial interpretation.
The EEOC regulations on major life activity, consistent with those
promulgated under the Rehabilitation Act,24 define major life activity
by way of example, listing “functions such as caring for oneself,
performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking,
breathing, learning, and working” as activities that are “major.”25
This list was not intended to be exhaustive,26 and the Commission
later added “[m]ental and emotional processes such as thinking,
concentrating, and interacting with others” as “other examples of
major life activities” in its Compliance Manual.27 Covered activities
share the trait of being “basic activities that the average person in the
general population can perform with little or no difficulty.” 28
22. See, e.g., Guzman-Rosario v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 397 F.3d 6, 9 (1st Cir. 2003) (“We have
regularly consulted EEOC definition of the terms . . . but no agency has been granted authority to issue
binding regulations.”); Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t, 380 F.3d 751, 762 n.7 (3d Cir.
2004) (stating, post-Sutton, that “‘we are guided by the Regulations issued by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (‘EEOC’) to implement Title I of the Act’”) (quoting Deane v. Pocono Med.
Ctr., 142 F.3d 138, 143 n.4 (3d Cir. 1998)).
23. Although the definition of disability also requires plaintiffs to show an “impairment,” few cases
have focused on this requirement. See, e.g., Lisa Eichhorn, Major Litigation Activities Regarding Major
Life Activities: The Failure of the “Disability” Definition in the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,
77 N.C. L. REV. 1405, 1475 (1999) (“In the vast majority of ADA cases, the impairment issue rarely
surfaces as a point of contention.”).
24. 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j)(2)(ii) (2006). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) app. (2002) (noting that ADA
regulations “adopt . . . the definition of the term ‘major life activities’ found in the regulations
implementing section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act”).
25. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2008).
26. See Bragdon v. Abbot, 524 U.S. 624, 639 (1998) ( “As the use of the term ‘such as’ confirms, the
list is illustrative, not exhaustive.”).
27. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL § 902.3(b)
(definition of the term “disability”).
28. 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(i) (2002).
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The Supreme Court clarified in Bragdon v. Abbott that “[t]he plain
meaning of the word ‘major’ denotes comparative importance” and
“suggest[s] that the touchstone for determining an activity’s inclusion
under the statutory rubric is its significance.”29 In reaching this
conclusion, the majority rejected the dissent’s position that “major”
was more appropriately defined “as ‘greater in quantity, number or
extent’” because the activities listed by the EEOC all “are repetitively
performed and essential in the day-to-day existence of a normally
functioning individual.” 30
The dissent’s position gained traction in Toyota Motor
Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams,31 however, when the
Court seemingly adopted a combination of the two definitions
articulated in Bragdon. In Toyota, the majority concluded that major
life activities encompass “those activities that are of central
importance to daily life.”32 The Court also clarified that heightened
requirements attach when alleging a substantial limitation in
performing manual tasks, an activity identified in the regulations.33
The Court reasoned that if each restricted task identified by the
plaintiff fails to independently qualify as major, then “together they
must do so” in order to satisfy the statutory definition.34 The Court
concluded that the definitional terms “need to be interpreted strictly
to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled,” or there
would be significantly more Americans in the protected class than the
43,000,000 individuals with disabilities identified by Congress in the
General Provisions of the ADA.35
Courts have taken heed of the Supreme Court’s admonition and
looked critically at those activities that fall outside of the EEOC
regulations. At various times, courts have rejected driving, sleeping,
eliminating waste, concentrating, interacting with others, and
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Bragdon, 524 U.S. at 638 (quoting Abbot v. Bragdon, 107 F.3d 934, 939, 940 (1st Cir. 1997)).
Id. at 660.
Toyota Motor Mfg., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002).
Id. at 197.
Id. at 199–200.
Id. at 197.
Id.
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thinking as major life activities,36 despite the EEOC’s opinions to the
contrary on many such activities.37 Courts have relied on a variety of
rationales in rejecting these activities, including that they are
insufficiently significant to society at large, too narrow, too
infrequent, or voluntary and therefore not covered.38 Although Sutton
counsels that the inquiry into an activity’s significance should be
determined objectively from society’s perspective rather than from an
individual’s point of view,39 there is some evidence suggesting that
courts are more likely to identify an activity as major when alleged
by plaintiffs with physical, rather than mental, impairments.40
36. See, e.g., Kellog v. Energy Safety Servs., Inc., 544 F.3d 1121, 1125–26 (10th Cir. 2008) (holding
that “driving is not itself a major life activity”); Haynes v. Williams, 392 F.3d 478, 485 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(Williams, J., concurring) (questioning whether sleep is a major life activity); Fiscus v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 385 F.3d 378, 385 (3d Cir. 2004) (discussing district court’s finding that eliminating waste was not
a major life activity); Humbles v. Principi, No. 04-1218, 2005 WL 1581257, at *3 (10th Cir. July 7,
2005) (finding that “interactions with others and concentration have not been deemed major life
activities by this circuit”); Boerst v. Gen. Mills Operations, Inc., No. 00-3281, 2002 WL 59637, at *3
(6th Cir. Jan. 15, 2002) (thinking). For a general discussion of earlier cases interpreting the major life
activity requirement, see Curtis D. Edmonds, Snakes and Ladders: Expanding the Definition of “Major
Life Activity” in the Americans with Disabilities Act, 33 TEX. TECH L. REV. 321, 325 (2002).
37. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(i) (2002); EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, supra note 27, at 902.3(b); The U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, EEOC
Enforcement Guidance on the Americans with Disabilities Act and Psychiatric Disabilities [hereinafter
Enforcement Guidance], http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/psych.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2009).
Because these sources of guidance were not promulgated pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act,
they are not entitled to deference by courts. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). Many courts, however, have continued to find such sources to be persuasive.
See, e.g., Watson v. City of Miami Beach, 177 F.3d 932, 936 (11th Cir. 1999) (finding the Enforcement
Guidance “helpful”); McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226, 1235 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing
the Enforcement Guidance with approval).
38. See, e.g., Colwell v. Suffolk County Police Dep’t, 158 F.3d 635, 642–43 (2d Cir. 1998)
(emphasizing the gate-keeping function of the “major life activity” requirement in rejecting standing,
sitting, lifting objects, working and sleeping as major life activities, reasoning that otherwise plaintiffs
could minimize their burden of establishing a substantial limitation merely by “defin[ing] the major life
activity as narrowly as possible, with an eye toward conforming the definition to the particular facts of
his own case”); Brown v. BKW Drywall Supply, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 2d. 814, 826–27 (S.D. Ohio E. Div.
2004) (holding intermittent, episodic conditions are generally not considered disabilities under the ADA
unless they occur with sufficient frequency); Krauel v. Iowa Methodist Med. Ctr., 915 F. Supp. 102,
106–07 (S.D. Iowa 1995) (rejecting reproduction as a major life activity pre-Bragdon because although
all people walk, see, hear, speak and breathe unless prevented by illness, “[s]ome people choose not to
have children”).
39. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 483 (1999).
40. See Wendy F. Hensel, Interacting With Others: A Major Life Activity Under the ADA?, 2002
WIS. L. REV. 1139, 1142 (2002) (concluding that courts are more likely to find interacting with others a
major life activity in the context of physical impairments).

Published by Reading Room, 2009

7

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 7

648

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:3

C. Substantial Limitation
Of all the elements of the disability definition, the substantial
limitation requirement has been the subject of the most controversy.
Congress offered no explanation of “substantially limited” in the text
of the ADA. EEOC regulations define the term to mean an inability
“to perform a major life activity that the average person in the general
population can perform; or [s]ignificantly restricted as to the
condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform
a major life activity as compared to the condition, manner or duration
under which the average person in the general population can
perform that same major life activity.”41 In evaluating the degree of
limitation present, consideration is given to the following factors: “(i)
[t]he nature and severity of the impairment; (ii) [t]he duration or
expected duration of the impairment; and (iii) [t]he permanent or long
term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or
resulting from the impairment.”42
The Supreme Court initially adopted a relatively broad definition
of substantial limitation in Bragdon v. Abbot. The Court explained
that plaintiffs do not need to establish that they are absolutely
precluded from performing a major life activity to show a substantial
limitation, reasoning that “[t]he Act addresses substantial limitations
on major life activities, not utter inabilities.”43 Instead, the Court
concluded that when “significant limitations” are present, “the
definition is met even if the difficulties are not insurmountable.”44
Nevertheless, the Court’s interpretation has progressively become
more restrictive since Bragdon. Its scrutiny reached a high water
mark in Toyota, where the Court cited Webster’s Dictionary rather
than EEOC regulations in concluding that restrictions must be
“‘considerable’ or ‘to a large degree’” in order to satisfy the statutory

41.
42.
43.
44.

29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (2002).
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(2) (2002).
Bragdon v. Abbot, 524 U.S. 624, 641 (1998).
Id.
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definition.45 The Court made clear that plaintiffs will not secure class
coverage based on impairments “that interfere in only a minor way”
with an identified activity, and instead must demonstrate a “severe
restriction[.]”46 The Court offered no explanation for its departure
from the “significant restriction” language found in EEOC
regulations, which some have argued is a more lenient threshold.47
Although the “severe restriction” standard has created challenges
for plaintiffs, it is the Court’s interpretation of substantial limitation
in Sutton v. U.S. Airways, Inc. that has most impacted class
membership. In Sutton, the Court considered the role that medication
and other corrective devices play in evaluating whether an
impairment is sufficiently limiting to be a protected disability.48 The
EEOC’s Interpretive Guidance had directed courts to consider
plaintiffs’ limitations without regard to any alleviating measures
employed by them.49 This position was consistent with all other
agencies interpreting the disability definition, as well as the
legislative history of the ADA.50 Every Circuit Court of Appeal to
consider the issue prior to the Tenth Circuit in the underlying case
had adopted the EEOC’s position.51 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court
concluded that the plain language of the statute requires courts to
consider all mitigating measures taken by plaintiffs, including
medication, assistive technology, and internal coping mechanisms, in
determining whether the substantial limitation requirement is
satisfied.52

45. Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002) (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2280 (1976)).
46. Id. See also Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565 (1999) (holding that “a mere
difference” in the way the activity is performed will not establish a substantial limitation); Benko v.
Portage Area Sch. Dist., 241 F.3d Appx. 842, 846 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding plaintiff not disabled because
he did not demonstrate a ‘severe restriction” arising out of degenerative disk disease).
47. See Eichhorn, supra note 16, at 202–03 (discussing court decisions interpreting the “severe
restriction” standard to be a higher threshold for plaintiffs).
48. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 481 (1999).
49. 29 CFR pt. 1630, app. § 1630.2(j) (1998).
50. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 496, 499–501 (Stephens, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 495–96.
52. Id. at 487.
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Although many have questioned the wisdom of other Supreme
Court decisions interpreting the disability definition, it is Sutton’s
restriction on mitigating measures that has received the most
condemnation from scholars and disability advocates alike. It has
been extremely difficult for individuals with impairments that are
even moderately controlled through ameliorative measures to
establish coverage under the ADA. Individuals with impairments that
society commonly considers to be disabilities—mental retardation,
multiple sclerosis, diabetes, epilepsy and cancer, to name a few—
have been judged not disabled within the meaning of the law.53 In a
turn unexpected by Congress, those impaired individuals who are
most capable of being active, productive members of society have
simultaneously become those least likely to receive legal protection
under the ADA.
D. “Regarded As” Being Disabled
In light of the exacting showing necessary to establish an actual
disability under the ADA, some advocates believed that that the
regarded as prong would more readily facilitate class membership.
This prong was originally conceived as a “catch-all” that would cover
individuals who were not limited in a major life activity, but who
nevertheless were treated as if they were by a defendant.54 This
approach arose out of the Supreme Court’s decision under the
Rehabilitation Act in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,
which recognized that defendants’ “accumulated myths and fears
about disability and disease” can be more limiting than any actual
impairment experienced by plaintiffs.55 Scholars had interpreted
Arline to mean that a disability is established whenever an individual
53. See cases cited supra note 2.
54. See Anderson, supra note 3, at 1004 (noting that the regarded as prong “had been understood by
many, including some among its drafters, to be a catch-all category for those who are not limited enough
to be actually disabled, but who can show that the employer treated them as though they were so
limited”); Alex B. Long, (Whatever Happened To) the ADA’s “Record Of” Prong(?), 81 WASH. L. REV.
669, 680–81 (2006) (same).
55. Sch. Bd. of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987).
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is “discriminated against because of any impairment[.]”56 A report by
the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources evaluating the
original ADA is consistent with this interpretation, stating that “[a]
person who is excluded from any activity covered under this Act
or . . . otherwise discriminated against because of a covered entity’s
negative attitudes toward disability is being treated as having a
disability which affects a major life activity.”57
The Supreme Court in Sutton, however, took a significantly more
restrictive view. Relying on a literalist reading of the statute, the
Court concluded that a regarded as claim may be asserted only when
the plaintiff establishes that the defendant believed him or her to have
an impairment which substantially limits a major life activity. If a
defendant acts on the basis of an impairment that is perceived to be
less restrictive, no regarded as claim will arise.58 Given the subjective
nature of this inquiry, it can be difficult to make the requisite
showing in the absence of direct evidence, particularly in those cases
which allege work as the major life activity in question.59 In order to
establish a disability on this basis, EEOC regulations require
plaintiffs to demonstrate that they are restricted in a class or broad
range of jobs,60 and Sutton requires this same showing in regarded as
cases. Because few plaintiffs can demonstrate that a defendant
believed them to be precluded not only from their current job, but
also a wide variety of other positions,61 most scholars agree that the

56. Chai R. Feldblum, Definition of Disability Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Law: What
Happened? Why? And What Can We Do About It?, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 91, 92 (2000)
(discussing early court cases).
57. S. REP. NO. 101-116, at 24 (1989).
58. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 473 (1999).
59. See Wendy F. Hensel & Gregory Jones, Bridging the Physical-Mental Gap: An Empirical Look
at the Impact of Physical Illness Stigma on ADA Outcomes, 73 TENN. L. REV. 47, 69 (2005) (study
finding that work as a major life activity “is rarely a winning strategy for any plaintiff”).
60. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(3)(i) (2008).
61. See, e.g., Sutton, 527 U.S. at 473 (1999) (affirming grant of summary judgment where plaintiffs
failed to demonstrate that United viewed them as incapable of performing a broad range of jobs). See
also Arlene B. Mayerson, Restoring Regard for the “Regarded As” Prong: Giving Effect to
Congressional Intent, 42 VILL. L. REV. 587, 598 (1997) (noting that “courts are interpreting the single
job exception so broadly that any rejection, no matter how broad the implications, can be reduced to a
‘single job’—namely, the job at issue”).
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regarded as prong has largely failed to provide the broad coverage
originally intended by Congress.62
II. THE ADA AMENDMENTS ACT: THE PRODUCT OF BIPARTISANSHIP
A. Legislative History
As a result of restrictive judicial interpretation of the definition of
disability, most scholars and disability advocates agree that the ADA
has not lived up to its promise of preventing discrimination and
integrating people with disabilities into the mainstream of society.63
Not surprisingly, there have been many calls to amend the ADA,
which increased in frequency following the Court’s decision in
Toyota in 2002.64 The first serious legislative response took place in
June 2007, when the ADA Restoration Act (“ADARA”) was
introduced in the House and Senate.65 The bill, which had been
carefully crafted by the disability rights community, initially
proposed changing the definition of disability to require only a
physical or mental impairment.66

62. See Feldblum, supra note 56, at 141 (stating that “the assumption that the third prong of the
disability definition would protect individuals with a range of impairments who are not covered under
the first and second prongs never materialized in ADA cases”).
63. See, e.g., Eichhorn, supra note 23, at 1408 (“Although the ADA has been hailed as the chief
accomplishment of a civil rights movement on behalf of people with disabilities, the way in which
“disability” is defined in the statute has undercut its effectiveness as a guarantor of civil rights.”);
Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The Supreme Court’s Definition of Disability Under the ADA: A Return to the
Dark Ages, 52 ALA. L. REV. 321, 321 (2000) (stating that recent Supreme Court decisions “drastically
curtailed the number of persons who may seek protection from discrimination on the basis of disability
under the ADA and seriously limited the circumstances under which even individuals with obvious
disabilities may seek protection from discrimination”); Miranda Oshige McGowan, Reconsidering the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 35 GA. L. REV. 27, 36 (2000) (“If the ADA was meant to be a
revolutionary remaking of America, then the judicial interpretation and implementation of the ADA’s
employment title has been nothing less than a betrayal of the ADA’s promise.”).
64. See, e.g., Chai R. Feldblum et al., The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 13 TEX. J. C.L. & C.R.
187, 193–94 (2008) (describing the Toyota case as “a turning point for many individuals in the disability
community, as well as their Congressional allies”).
65. ADA Restoration Act of 2007, H.R. 3195, 110th Cong. § 4. Notably, a form of the bill had been
introduced in late 2006, but it became evident that efforts to secure its passage were not “ultimately
feasible.” Feldblum et al., supra note 64, at 197 (describing H.R. 6258 (2006)).
66. ADA Restoration Act of 2007, H.R. 3195, 110th Cong. § 4.
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As support for ADARA grew over time, the business community
voiced its opposition to the bill.67 Similar concerns were echoed by
the Justice Department on behalf of the Bush Administration.68
Ultimately, however, the business community was persuaded by a
few members of Congress to meet with disability rights advocates to
determine whether a consensus bill could be developed.69 Following
a marathon of meetings and negotiation sessions,70 the ultimate result
was the first version of the ADAAA, which passed the House by a
vote of 402-17 on June 25, 2008.71
When the Senate took up consideration of the bill, opponents
voiced objections to many of its provisions. The concern that gained
traction, however, related to the provision stating that an impairment
“substantially limits” a major life activity when it “materially
restricts” that activity. Many believed that the “materially restricts”
language was ambiguous and no more instructive to courts than
existing precedent,72 and the Senate’s version deleted this language
from the bill. The Senate unanimously passed the revised ADAAA
on September 11, 2008,73 and the House passed the Senate’s version
shortly thereafter.74

67. See Feldblum et al., supra note 64, at 229 (describing early support and opposition for the
ADARA).
68. Id. at 229.
69. See id. (describing the efforts of “Majority Leader Steny Hoyer and Congressman Jim
Sensenbrenner”).
70. Id. at 229–30 (describing the negotiations as “thirteen weeks of meetings . . . endless drafting and
redrafting of legislative language . . . and numerous meetings and calls for internal vetting within the
separate communities”).
71. 154 CONG. REC. H6081 (daily ed. June 25, 2008).
72. See, e.g., Long, supra note 4, at 219 (noting that the “materially restricts” language “did little to
clarify the meaning of substantial limitation”); Andrew M. Grossman, The Senate’s ADA Amendments
Act: Only Half Bad, HERITAGE FOUNDATION WEB MEMO, 1 (Aug. 18, 2008) available at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Legalissues/upload/wm_2028.pdf (describing the “materially
restricts” language as “Replacing a Cipher for a Cipher”); Council on Law in Higher Education, The
ADA Amendments Act: Overview and Analysis,
http://www.clhe.org/clhe/wp-content/uploads/2009/01/eiada2008.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2009)
(“Unless more clarity is provided in the legislation, there will be significant confusion as to what
constitutes ‘significantly limits.’”).
73. 154 CONG. REC. S8342 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2008).
74. 154 CONG. REC. H8298 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2008).
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B. General Statutory Provisions
The ADAAA represents an interesting mix of sweeping change
and adherence to the status quo. The legislation repudiates the
Supreme Court’s endorsement of a restrictive definition of disability,
declaring that this position has “narrowed the broad scope of
protection” that Congress intended to afford through the ADA.75
Congress specifically rejects the language of Sutton and Toyota,76 and
eliminates the declaration in the original ADA that “43 Million
Americans have disabilities”—language the Court had repeatedly
used to justify the need for a “demanding standard” of disability.77
The statute’s antidiscrimination focus is reinforced by the bill’s
direction to courts to give “primary . . . attention . . . [to] whether
entities covered under the ADA have complied with their
obligations.”78 Although the requirement of class membership
remains in the legislation, the ADAAA clarifies that this inquiry
“should not demand extensive analysis.”79 In language sure to be
repeatedly cited by courts, Congress makes clear that “[t]he definition
of disability . . . shall be construed in favor of broad coverage . . . to
the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this Act.”80
Reflecting the input of the business community, the ADAAA
retains the ADA’s original definition of disability and continues to
require plaintiffs to show an impairment which substantially limits a
major life activity to establish class membership via the first prong.81
Although the impairment requirement stands unaltered, the ADAAA
represents a significant departure from the original legislation
because its broad new definitions of “major life activity” and
75. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(a)(4)–(5), 122 Stat. 3553, 3553.
76. Id. § 2(b)(2)–(4).
77. Id. § 3(1). For an example of the Court’s use of this language, see, e.g., U.S. Airways, Inc. v.
Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 405 (2002); and Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 484 (1999). To
this end, the legislation also removes the original finding that people with disabilities are “a discrete and
insular minority.” ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 3(2).
78. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 2(b)(5).
79. Id.
80. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 4(a), 122 Stat. 3553, 3553 (2008).
81. Id.
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“substantial limitation” have the potential to meaningfully expand the
legal protection of people with disabilities.
The ADAAA for the first time provides a statutory list of major
life activities that are covered under the law. This list includes all of
the activities identified in the formal EEOC regulations82 and adds
“eating, sleeping . . . standing, lifting, bending . . . reading,
concentrating, thinking, and communicating” as non-exhaustive
examples of covered activities.83 Reflecting the broad intent of
Congress, the statute also recognizes “the operation of a major bodily
function, including but not limited to, functions of the immune
system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological,
brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine and reproductive functions,”
as a major life activity.84 As is apparent, this expansive list is likely
to encompass virtually every physiological disorder experienced by
plaintiffs, lowering the hurdle erected by this requirement. The
ADAAA also makes clear that the EEOC, Attorney General, and
Secretary of Transportation have the authority to promulgate
regulations on the disability definition, ending judicial debate on this
issue.85
In a major shift, the ADAAA reverses Sutton and directs courts to
undertake the substantial limitation inquiry “without regard to the
ameliorative effects of mitigating measures[.]”86 Although “ordinary
eyeglasses or contact lenses” are exempted from coverage,87 there is
some protection even for plaintiffs in this category. The statute
provides that any qualification standard which requires a certain level
of uncorrected vision must be job-related and consistent with
business necessity in order to be lawful.88 This significant change

82. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2008) (listing caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking,
seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning and working as major life activities).
83. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 4(a) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)).
84. Id. (amending 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(B)).
85. Id. § 6(a)(2) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 12205a).
86. Id. § 4(a) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(i)).
87. Id. § 4(a) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(E)(ii)).
88. Id. § 5(a) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 12113(c)).
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overrules years of case law and may have a profound impact on class
membership under the ADA.
The revised statute also overturns significant judicial precedent
limiting the statute’s coverage of individuals with episodic
impairments, such as epilepsy and asthma. As described earlier,
EEOC regulations direct courts to consider the duration of an
individual’s impairment in evaluating whether it is substantially
limiting.89 As a result, courts have often denied class membership to
individuals with impairments that are debilitating when active, but
which often have long periods of latency or remission.90 This
reasoning has proven to be particularly problematic for individuals
with psychiatric disorders, who, even with otherwise debilitating
impairments, can experience periods of relative calm and well-being
through counseling and medication.91 The ADAAA reverses this
trend, declaring that impairments that are “episodic or in remission”
are covered disabilities even in their latent stages if they “would
substantially limit a major life activity when active.”92
Perhaps the most radical change in the statute, however, is the
revised interpretation of the regarded as prong of the disability
determination. The ADAAA provides that an individual who has
89. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1) (2002).
90. See, e.g., Cassimy v. Bd. of Educ. Rockford County Sch., 461 F.3d 932, 937 (7th Cir. 2006)
(holding elementary school principal was not disabled because “isolated bouts of depression” were not
permanent or long-term); Vande Zande v. Wis. Dep’t of Admins., 44 F.3d 538, 544 (2d Cir. 1995)
(“Intermittent, episodic impairments are not disabilities.”); Alderdice v. Am. Health Holdings, Inc., 118
F. Supp. 2d 856, 863–64 (S.D. Oh. 2000) (finding plaintiff with cancer not disabled because cancer was
in remission at the time of termination). See also Douglas E. Blair, Employees Suffering From Bipolar
Disorder or Clinical Depression: Fighting an Uphill Battle for Protection Under Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 1347, 1396 (1999) (stating that “because . . .
mental illnesses often undergo periods of remission…individuals may have trouble overcoming
precedent holding that intermittent and episodic conditions are not impairments for purposes of Title I”).
But see Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 309 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that that although
plaintiff’s bipolar disorder did not cause “problems every day[,]” it could be a protected disability
because “[c]hronic, episodic conditions can easily limit how well a person performs an activity as
compared to the rest of the population: repeated flare-ups of poor health can have a cumulative weight
that wears down a person’s resolve and continually breaks apart longer-term projects.”).
91. See, e.g., Glowacki v. Buffalo Gen. Hosp., 2 F. Supp. 2d 346, 351–52 (W.D.N.Y. 1998) (finding
plaintiff with Bipolar Affective Disorder not disabled because her condition, at most, “‘sporadically
lessened her ability to think, concentrate and work effectively’”).
92. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(a)(4)–(5), 122 Stat. 3553, 3553
(amending 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D)).
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experienced discrimination “because of an actual or perceived
physical impairment[,] whether or not the impairment limits or is
perceived to limit a major life activity,” is regarded as having a
disability.93 As a result, once a plaintiff demonstrates that he or she
has an impairment, the only question remaining is whether the
defendant acted on that basis. Once this threshold is crossed, a
plaintiff automatically establishes a protected disability, and the focus
in litigation will shift to the appropriateness of the defendant’s
conduct.
The potential breadth of this change, however, is limited in some
meaningful respects. First, Congress excluded individuals with
impairments that are “transitory and minor,” defined as having “an
actual or expected duration of 6 months or less,” from class
membership under the regarded as prong.94 In addition, Congress
made clear that individuals requesting reasonable accommodation
must establish an actual disability to seek this form of relief under the
ADA.95 This change settles a long-standing split among circuits as to
whether plaintiffs proceeding under the regarded as prong are entitled
to reasonable accommodation.96 Accordingly, the revised regarded as
prong will facilitate class membership only for those who seek relief
from an adverse action unrelated to accommodation requests.

93. Id. § 4(a) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A)).
94. Id. § 4(a) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B)). Notably, the United States Office of
Management and Budget objected to the conjunctive nature of this defense, arguing it would be more
appropriate to exclude impairments that are transitory or minor. See Executive Office of the President,
Statement of Administrative Policy: HR3195 – ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (June 24, 2008) (“The bill
does exclude impairments that are both transitory and minor; however, those that are one or the other
would be covered. As a result, the bill could extend ADA protection to a short bout with the flu or a
mild seasonal allergy. The Administration believes that the bill should exclude from coverage
impairments that are either transitory or minor.”), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/legislative/sap/110-2/saphr3195-r.pdf. Congress’ refusal to alter this
language strongly suggests that temporary impairments that are otherwise significant are covered under
the regarded as prong.
95. Id. § 6(a) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 12201(h)).
96. See Lawrence D. Rosenthal, Reasonable Accommodations for Individuals Regarded as Having
Disabilities Under the Americans with Disabilities Act? Why “No” Should Not Be the Answer, 36
SETON HALL L. REV. 895, 919–56 (2006) (surveying cases).
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III. RIGHTS RESURGENCE: THE ADAAA’S IMPACT ON SCHOOLS AND
UNIVERSITIES
All claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act97 arising after
January 1, 2009, will be impacted in some way by the passage of the
ADAAA. Although it will be many years before the full significance
of the legislation is clear, there can be little doubt that the landscape
for schools and universities is changing rapidly. This section
identifies and discusses the issues that are likely to arise as a result of
the Amendments. Notably, because schools and universities employ
more than 8 million people in the United States, this section begins
with an exploration of the Act’s impact on these institutions in their
role as employers.98 The remainder of the discussion focuses on the
legislation’s likely effect on eligibility and accommodation decisions
relating to students with disabilities in both higher education and
elementary and secondary schools.
A. Employment in Schools and Universities
The ADAAA’s potential impact on the employment of people with
disabilities has dominated popular and scholarly attention throughout
the legislative process.99 This focus is not surprising given the nearly
universal view that the original legislation failed to protect people
with disabilities in the workplace as intended.100 It is notable that the
two Supreme Court ADA cases decided in plaintiffs’ favor did not
97. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 7, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553 (amending
Rehabilitation Act to conform to ADAAA).
98. See
Careeronestop,
“Industries
with
the
Largest
Employment,”
http://www.acinet.org/acinet/indview3.asp?id=8,&nodeid=47. This number includes 6.2 million teachers
alone. See Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Special Edition: Teacher Appreciation Week (May 2-8),
http://www.census.gov/PressRelease/www/releases/archives/facts_for_features_special_editions/001737.html (Apr. 22, 2004).
99. See, e.g., Feldblum et al., supra note 64, at 234–35. See also Letter from ACT et al. to Edward
Kennedy, Thomas Harkin, Arlen Specter & Ted Stevens, United States Senate Leaders [hereinafter
“Letter from ACT”] (July 14, 2008), available at
http://www.aamc.org/advocacy/library/educ/corres/2008/071408s.pdf (noting that “the discussions that
have occurred to date” about pending disability legislation “have focused on its likely impact on
employers and employees”).
100. See sources cited supra note 63.
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relate to employment; instead, they alleged discrimination by public
accommodations.101 For many courts, disability has remained
synonymous with incapacity and excludes the individual who is
generally able to function in the workplace.102
Congress clearly intends to shift the balance of power in ADA
litigation through the amendments, particularly with respect to the
disability inquiry. Schools and universities are major employers in
United States103 and are well advised to consider all policies and
practices relating to the identification and accommodation of
employees with impairments. Because the employment law
implications of the ADAAA are of interest to employers generally
and are likely to receive detailed attention elsewhere, however, this
section will only briefly highlight notable areas of change.
1. Expanding Numbers of Covered Employees
Several titles of the ADA regulate the employment of individuals
with disabilities in schools and universities. Title I governs
employment relationships in private institutions which employ at
least 15 individuals,104 and the Rehabilitation Act also applies if they
receive support from the federal government.105 Although Title II
technically governs these same relationships in public institutions, the
employment claims of state employees are evaluated pursuant to the
standards established in Title I.106
101. See PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 523 U.S. 661 (2001); Bragdon v. Abbot, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
102. See, e.g., Paula E. Berg, Ill/Legal: Interrogating the Meaning and Function of the Category of
Disability in Antidiscrimination Law, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 33–34 (1999) (discussing ways in
which the “law is profoundly suspicious of any plaintiff who professes to be limited by a physical or
mental impairment”).
103. In 2006, elementary and secondary schools collectively were identified as the “industry” with the
largest employment, while colleges and universities were identified as the sixth largest. See
Careeronestop, “Industries with the Largest Employment,”
http://www.acinet.org/acinet/indview3.asp?id=8,&nodeid=47. This number includes 6.2 million
teachers alone. See Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Special Edition: Teacher Appreciation Week
(May 2-8),http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/facts_for_features_special_
editions/001737.html (Apr. 22, 2004).
104. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A) (2006).
105. 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (2006).
106. 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2); 28 C.F.R. § 35.140(b)(1) (2008).
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There is no question that the Amendments will significantly
expand the protected class under all of these provisions. The
ADAAA’s direction to give a broad interpretation to the disability
inquiry, coupled with its repudiation of Sutton and Toyota, will make
it significantly easier for employees to establish an actual disability in
court. Sutton’s direction to consider mitigating measures markedly
diminished plaintiffs’ ability to establish a protected disability, and its
rejection is likely to have an equally profound impact.107 At a
minimum, employees with impairments that the public has
traditionally viewed as disabilities—epilepsy, diabetes, missing
limbs, cancer and the like—are likely to establish class membership
relatively easily in the future.
There undoubtedly will also be a jump in class coverage under the
regarded as prong. Under the new statute, whenever an employer
makes a decision based on an employee’s real or perceived
impairment, regardless of its perceived severity, the employer
automatically bestows a covered disability on the employee.108 As a
result, litigation in this area in the future is likely to focus on
causation and the legitimacy of the adverse employment action in
dispute. This has the potential to be a complicated inquiry and has
caused confusion among courts and scholars in the past.109 There may
be many cases, however, that do not dispute this relationship. In
Sutton, for example, all parties agreed that the plaintiffs were not
hired as airline pilots because of their severe myopia.110 In this type
of case, the ADAAA may significantly expand the law’s reach.
Nevertheless, the Amendments do not eradicate the continued need
for inquiry into the plaintiff’s medical condition, and questions
107. See, e.g., Hensel & Jones, supra note 59, at 67 (study finding “a highly significant difference”
between plaintiffs’ ability to establish a disability before and after Sutton).
108. See discussion supra at II.B. See also Long, supra note 4, at 224 (explaining that “the new
amendments place the focus on the employer’s motivation . . . [i]f a plaintiff has a physical or mental
impairment and can show that the impairment motivated the defendant’s adverse action, the plaintiff can
claim coverage under the ‘regarded as’ prong, regardless of how limiting the impairment actually is”).
109. See, e.g., Cheryl L. Anderson, What is “Because of the Disability” Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act? Reasonable Accommodation, Causation, and the Windfall Doctrine, 27 BERKELEY J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 323 (2006) (discussing court treatment of causation under the ADA).
110. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 476 (1999).
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remain about courts’ future treatment of each element of the
disability inquiry. It is possible, for example, that employers and
courts will direct more attention to the determination of whether a
plaintiff has an impairment recognized by law. Although this element
has received relatively little attention in the past, it now has
heightened significance, particularly in the revised regarded as
inquiry. There are some conditions, like obesity, which have been
viewed with some skepticism by courts and would seem well-suited
to this new approach.111
It is unlikely, however, that this element will become a
burdensome component of the disability inquiry. EEOC regulations
broadly define impairment,112 and this agency is unlikely to narrow
its definition in the future given Congress’ mandate for broad
coverage. In addition, the determination of whether a condition
qualifies as an impairment will depend, for the most part, on expert
medical testimony on the nature of the condition. Because a battle of
experts does not lend itself to resolution on summary judgment, it is
unlikely to gain traction as a wide-spread defense strategy.113
The new statutory list of major life activities will undoubtedly
reduce litigation on this component of the disability definition. Courts
will no longer debate the legitimacy of the identified activities or the
deference owed to the implementing regulations. Litigation in this
area is likely to continue, however, because the statutory list, like its
predecessor regulation, makes clear that it is not exhaustive.
111. See, e.g., Mary Crossley, The Disability Kaleidoscope, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 678–88
(1999) (discussing court treatment of obesity as an impairment). See also Watson v. City of Miami
Beach, 177 F.3d 932, 935 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding that plaintiff’s paranoid, oppositional and
threatening behavior did not establish a mental impairment); Mundo v. Sanus Health Plan of N.Y., 966
F. Supp. 171, 173 (E.D.N.Y 1997) (rejecting inability to tolerate stressful situations as an impairment
under ADA); and 1 CORP. COUNSEL’S GUIDE TO AM. WITH DISABILITIES ACT § 2:2 (2005) (discussing
impairments rejected by courts).
112. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(h) (2008).
113. Notably, one circuit has found that a plaintiff’s testimony on this issue standing alone “may
suffice to establish a genuine issue of material fact” for purposes of summary judgment. See Head v.
Glacier Nw., Inc., 413 F.3d 1053, 1058 (9th Cir. 2005). See also Wong v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 379
F.3d 1097, 1106 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that plaintiff’s diagnosis with a learning disability was “[a]t a
minimum . . . sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he suffers from an
impairment”).
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Congress’ decision to provide a list of activities rather than a
description of the commonalities between them leaves the door open
for restrictive judicial interpretation. In the absence of further
guidance, Bragdon’s holding that “significance” is the touchstone of
major life activities continues to guide this inquiry.114 The divergent
conclusions reached by courts when applying this standard to such
common activities as driving115 and interacting with others116 reflects
the limitation of this definition. Notably, the ADAAA’s lowered
threshold of disability is likely to encourage plaintiffs with weaker
claims to coverage to come forward. These plaintiffs may feel
pressured to identify narrow, questionable activities in order to more
readily satisfy the substantial limitation requirement.
It is the legislation’s alteration of the substantial limitation inquiry,
however, that will have the most immediate impact on employer
schools and universities. The new law makes clear that impairments
need not be “severe” or even “significant” in order to be legally
cognizable.117 Because Congress rejected defining disability as
“impairment,”118 it is also clear that plaintiffs must demonstrate at
least some meaningful limitation arising out of their disorders. Where
courts will draw the line between these extremes, however, is entirely
unclear. Although the statute exempts “transitory and minor”
impairments from coverage under the regarded as prong, this
limitation does not extend to the actual disability inquiry,119
presumably because the substantial limitation requirement remains in
place.

114. Bragdon v. Abbot, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998).
115. See Edmonds, supra note 36, at 360–63 (detailing court treatment of transportation and driving
as major life activities).
116. Compare Soileau v. Guilford of Me., 105 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 1997), and Davis v. Univ. of N.C.,
263 F.3d 95 (4th Cir. 2001), and Amir v. St. Louis Univ., 184 F.3d 1017 (8th Cir. 1999) (rejecting
interacting with others), with McAlindin v. County of San Diego, 192 F.3d 1226 (9th Cir. 1999)
(recognizing interacting with others). See also Hensel, supra note 40 (discussing court treatment of
interacting with others).
117. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(a)(4)–(5), 122 Stat. 3553, 3553.
118. ADA Restoration Act of 2007, H.R. 3195, 110th Cong. § 4.
119. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 4(a) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(B)).
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The “materially restricts” language offered in the original House
bill may provide some insight into Congressional intent despite its
ultimate rejection. One scholar involved in the drafting has described
the term as “intended, on a severity spectrum, to refer to something
that is less than ‘severely restricts,’ and less than ‘significantly
restricts,’ but more serious than a moderate impairment which is in
the middle of the spectrum.”120 Distinguishing which impairments
fall within these parameters is likely to prove a challenge that is not
resolved by simple citation to Congress’ direction to interpret
substantial limitation broadly. In the absence of further direction from
the EEOC, employers will need to proceed with extreme caution in
evaluating the severity of an employee’s impairment.
This calculation may prove particularly difficult in the context of
episodic impairments. The new law makes clear that “if” impairments
in this category “would substantially limit a major life activity when
active,” they will be covered even when latent or in remission.121
This provision seems relatively straightforward in cases involving
employees with a documented history of meaningful episodic illness,
like cancer or serious mental illness. It also readily covers disorders
that have periodic flare ups despite being well controlled generally by
medication, like diabetes and epilepsy.122 It is possible, however, that
this provision will extend beyond these categories in ways unforeseen
by the drafters.
These provisions not only permit employers to speculate about an
employee’s condition, but often will require it. The purpose of the
statute is to exempt plaintiffs from the need to show a substantially
limiting impairment in the present. Problematically, however, the
statute does not require plaintiffs to show that they experienced a
substantially limiting impairment in the past. Instead, a literal reading
of the statutory language suggests that plaintiffs will be able to
120. See Feldblum et al., supra note 64, at 236.
121. ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 4(a) (amending 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D)).
122. Notably, the statute’s direction to consider impairments in the unmitigated state would likely
resolve most difficulties for these individuals in any event. See id. § 4(a) (amending 42 U.S.C. §
12102(4)(E)(i)).
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establish a disability where there is only the possibility of developing
a substantial limitation in the future. If an expert hypothesizes that
what is now a mild impairment will “substantially limit a major life
activity when active,” the statutory language, on its face, appears to
be satisfied. If this reading is correct, it has the potential to require
employers to accommodate individuals who have only hypothetically
demonstrated the possibility of meaningful limitation at some point in
the future.
Take, for example, an employee who has experienced minor
depressive episodes in the past, common to many people. If the
employee secures a psychiatrist’s note indicating that that he or she
will experience an active episode of debilitating depression if certain
accommodations are not granted, the literal language of the statue
would seem to cover the employee’s hypothetical condition.
Likewise, an individual diagnosed with a progressive auto-immune
disorder may be covered from the moment the diagnosis is made,
regardless of the impairment’s present functional limitation. To some
extent, this immediate status would seem warranted because of the
discrimination often experienced by employees in this category. This
protection, however, is already available in the context of adverse
employment actions through the revised regarded as prong. Because
the accommodation mandate imposes affirmative obligations on
employers, the implications of recognizing speculative disabilities
under the actual disability prong would seem more problematic.
The significance of this possibility remains to be seen. The more
attenuated the disability inquiry from present actual functioning,
however, the more difficult it will be for employers and courts to
determine whether an individual is actually disabled and entitled to
the law’s protection. Hypothetical inquiries by nature carry with them
the potential for fraud and error, and this approach would seem to
conflict with the individualized inquiry that previously has been the
hallmark of the ADA.123
123. See, e.g., PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 688 (2001) (explaining that “the ADA was
enacted to eliminate discrimination against ‘individuals’ with disabilities . . . . To comply with this
command, an individualized inquiry must be made.”). Cf. Long, supra note 4, at 221 (“By directing
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2. Heightened Need for Documentation
For many years, employers and courts have largely focused on the
severity of an employee’s medical limitations when faced with a
request for accommodation or accusation of an unfair employment
action. Because more employees will easily establish a protected
disability under the new law, the focus in litigation will undoubtedly
turn to the legitimacy of the employment decision. Adequate
documentation will become increasingly important at every level of
decision-making.
In this regard, it is critical to recall that a covered disability,
standing alone, is insufficient to establish class membership under the
law. In order to receive the ADA’s protection, plaintiffs must also
demonstrate that they are qualified for the position in question, or
capable of performing the essential functions of the job with or
without accommodation.124 Because it is often difficult for courts to
determine the essential functions of a position, and an employer’s
judgment is entitled to consideration on this issue,125 it will be critical
for schools and universities to develop clear, detailed lists for each
position in advance of litigation and update them on regular basis.
This will provide clear guidelines both to employees and to courts of
the expectations and purposes attached to each position in the school.
It will also be important for employers to be particularly vigilant in
documenting each instance of poor performance on the job.
Documentation protects employees with disabilities by giving them
notice of their employer’s expectations and helping to ensure
equitable treatment. It protects employers, moreover, by ensuring that
any subsequent adverse action can be supported and justified. The
more clearly the record reflects a history of documented deficiencies,
the more difficult it will be for a plaintiff to show that the
courts to consider whether an impairment would substantially limit a major life activity if it were active,
the ADA Amendments Act allows courts to engage in this once-prohibited type of hypothetical inquiry,
at least in this one instance.”).
124. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006) (prohibiting discrimination against “qualified individual[s] on the
basis of a disability”); 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (defining “qualified”).
125. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3)(i)–(ii) (2008).
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employment action was taken “because of” his disability. Where such
evidence is absent, an inference of discriminatory intent is more
readily drawn.126
Documentation can be critical, moreover, to establishing goodfaith participation in the interactive process, which may preclude an
award of damages in subsequent litigation.127 This documentation
begins once an employee raises a request for accommodation
formally or informally.128 Front line managers and supervisors must
be trained to treat all requests for accommodation seriously and
immediately report them to HR professionals. Because mitigating
measures are no longer relevant to the disability inquiry, individuals
who appear to have insignificant limitations or no limitation at all
may nevertheless be entitled to accommodation under the ADA if
such functioning results from the use of medication or corrective
devices. The revised law requires employers to not only consider the
employee’s current functioning, but the restrictions that are likely to
be in place in the absence of such coping mechanisms.
Securing reliable information to judge the validity of requests for
accommodation may initially prove challenging. The ADA permits
employers to ask questions about the existence of a disability where
such questions are job-related and consistent with business
necessity.129 Although employers are allowed to seek medical
information to legitimate the need for accommodation, they are
limited to documentation which is “sufficient to substantiate . . . [the]
disability” and need for accommodation.130 Employers may not
126. See, e.g., Kelly Cahill Timmons, Accommodating Misconduct Under the Americans with
Disabilities Act, 57 FLA. L. REV. 187, 197–98 (2005) (describing prima facie case and burden shifting
under the ADA).
127. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (3) (2006) (“damages may not be awarded under this section where the
covered entity demonstrates good faith efforts, in consultation with the person with the disability who
has informed the covered entity that accommodation is needed, to identify and make a reasonable
accommodation that would provide such individual with an equally effective opportunity and would not
cause an undue hardship on the operation of the business.”).
128. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o)(3) (discussing interactive process).
129. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6).
130. EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Disability-Related Inquiries and Medical Examinations of
Employees
Under
the
Americans
with
Disabilities
Act
(ADA),
available
at
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/guidance-inquiries.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2009). The Guidance
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request information about prescription medication or other corrective
devices unless the employee is in a position which affects public
safety.131 An employer is also restricted from seeking an independent
examination by his own expert unless the documentation provided by
the employee is insufficient in some meaningful respect.132
Although these rules have not changed under the new law, the
reversal of Sutton makes information provided by physicians
increasingly important in the disability determination. In order to
secure accurate, helpful information about the limitations imposed by
employees’ impairments, it may be advisable to create a standard
form which specifically requests an explanation of the employee’s
medical limitations and need for accommodation without regard to
current medication or other mitigating measures taken by the
employee. Ironically, securing such information will be easier for
schools and universities in one respect—there is less of a need to
carefully balance their desire for knowledge against the fear that such
knowledge will set the stage for a regarded as claim. Although the
regarded as prong provides for relatively easy class membership in
the context of adverse employment actions, it cannot be used to
prosecute an action for failure to accommodate.
3. Increased Litigation
There is no question that administrators should anticipate a rise in
disability litigation in the wake of the ADAAA. In the past,
employers have been overwhelmingly successful in defeating
disability claims on motions to dismiss and motions for summary
judgment. In 2007, for example, employers won 95.5% of all ADA
provides that “[d]ocumentation is sufficient if it: (1) describes the nature, severity, and duration of the
employee’s impairment, the activity or activities that the impairment limits, and the extent to which the
impairment limits the employee’s ability to perform the activity or activities; and, (2) substantiates why
the requested reasonable accommodation is needed.” Id. See also EEOC, Questions and Answers:
Enforcement Guidance on Disability-Related Inquiries and Medical Examinations of Employees Under
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/qandainquiries.html, (last visited Mar. 8, 2009).
131. Id.
132. Id.
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cases, with the majority on the grounds the plaintiff could not
establish a protected disability under the ADA.133 The legislation’s
broadening of the key disability terms and direction to courts to give
broad construction to this inquiry will undoubtedly reverse this trend.
Attorneys who previously have been unwilling to take on ADA cases
because of the virtual certainty of losing may be encouraged to do so
in the wake of the ADAAA.134 This may be particularly true in the
case of plaintiffs with mental impairments, who have filed the second
largest number of EEOC claims but who are poorly represented in
federal court.135
It is worth noting, however, that the change in the law does not
guarantee plaintiffs victory in court. The ability of civil rights
legislation to change the landscape for people with disabilities
depends to a large extent on the willingness of the public to embrace
the law’s vision of equality. If legislation moves too far from public
acceptance, it is unlikely to prove effective in its execution. Judges,
who are members of the public, can easily find ways to defeat the
Act’s purpose within the parameters of judicial discretion. Many have
attributed the failure of the original ADA to disability advocates’
inability to convince the public of its legitimacy.136 The public never
signed on to or understood an imagery of disability that encompasses
fully functioning individuals.137 Uncomfortable with a broad
conception of disability, the majority of courts took a very technical
and literalist approach to the legislation which limited its reach and
potential impact.138
133. See Amy L. Allbright, Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title I – Survey Update, 32
MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 335, 336 (2008).
134. See, e.g., Allison Torres Burtka, ADA Amendments Take Effect, Broadening Protections, 45
TRIAL 14, 14 (2009) (speculating that the new law “will make it easier for people with disabilities to
find a lawyer to take their cases”).
135. See Hensel & Jones, supra note 59, at 73.
136. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, Backlash Against the ADA: Interdisciplinary Perspectives and
Implications for Social Justice Strategies, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 11 (2000) (describing
public backlash against disability rights advocacy).
137. Id. at 13.
138. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 109, at 324–25. Professor Anderson has argued that “while the
ADA attempts to change the treatment of individuals with disabilities under the law, the judiciary
continues to approach the legal questions posed by the Act with a deeply ingrained attachment to
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It is possible that this same type of judicial backlash may occur in
the wake of the ADAAA, particularly in the employment arena.
Although reaction to the legislation overwhelmingly has been
positive in light of the cooperation between the business community
and disability advocates, this has not universally been the case.139 If
there once again is a disconnect between society’s vision of disability
and the sweeping definition in the new legislation, courts will simply
find new avenues for limiting the statute’s reach. The concepts of
“reasonable accommodation” and “undue hardship” have received
relatively little attention to date and are sufficiently vague to provide
continuing flexibility to courts intent on restricting the ADA’s
reach.140
Fortunately, however, the time would seem particularly ripe for a
positive and expansive view of impairment. Historically, advances in
the understanding and legal treatment of disability have been closely
connected to the return of disabled veterans from foreign wars.141 As
a result of the war with Iraq and Afghanistan, the next decade will see
many such veterans seeking accommodation and acceptance in
society.142 Against this background, the ADAAA has a meaningful
chance to significantly alter the playing field for people with
disabilities in the workplace.
principles of formal equality that resists any attempts at modification. Despite rejection by Congress and
the Supreme Court of judicially crafted limitations on the right to accommodation in the name of formal
equality, the judiciary’s underlying values remain the same and simply manifest themselves in other
ways.” Id. See also Long, supra note 4, at 229 (noting that “[t]he new amendments do virtually nothing
to assist courts and potential litigants” with the “host of reasonable accommodation issues [still]
unresolved”).
139. See, e.g., Grossman, supra note 72, at 2; Posting of Richard Tuschman to Florida Employment
and Immigration Law Blog, http://www.flemploymentlawblog.com/tags/adaaa/ (Sept. 2, 2008)
(describing the ADAAA as “good news for lawyers, bad news for employers”).
140. See, e.g., Leslie Goddard, Searching for Balance in the ADA: Recent Developments in the Legal
and Practical Issues of Reasonable Accommodation, 35 IDAHO L. REV. 227, 230 (1999) (explaining that
the interplay between reasonable accommodation and undue hardship is “complicated” and raises many
unanswered questions).
141. See Ann Hubbard, A Military Coalition for Disability Rights, 75 MISS. L.J. 975, 995 (2006)
(“[D]isability policy has advanced in the wake of . . . wars, prompted by political, social and economic
imperatives for the rehabilitation, support, care, education, and reintegration of veterans.”).
142. See, e.g., Linda Blimes, The Battle of the Wounded, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2007, at A23 (noting that
“more than 200,000 veterans from Iraq and Afghanistan have been treated at VA facilities,” some of
whom have “crippling disabilities”).
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B. Eligibility and Academic Accommodations in Higher Education
The ADA requires both public and private universities to provide
reasonable accommodations to all eligible students with disabilities
who attend or desire to attend their institutions.143 In addition, Title
III requires testing agencies and professional licensing boards to
administer tests in “a place and manner accessible to persons with
disabilities.”144 Students at all levels of education have had greater
success in establishing coverage under these provisions than have
employees under Title I.145 Notably, the majority of these cases are
lost for reasons other than the plaintiff’s inability to establish a
protected disability.146 The ADAAA’s newly expanded definition of
substantial limitation and overruling of Sutton will increase these
favorable odds for students, particularly in the context of learning
disabilities. Nevertheless, because institutions of higher education
have generally taken a broader view of disability and accommodation
for students than the law has required, 147 the ultimate impact of this
expansion may be limited.
1. The Historical Treatment of Learning Disabilities under the
ADA and Rehabilitation Act
Regulations promulgated by the EEOC and DOJ identify learning
as a major life activity,148 and it is no surprise that over 40% of
students with disabilities in higher education claim a substantial

143. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (2006). See also 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (applying
antidiscrimination mandate to entities receiving federal funds).
144. 42 U.S.C. § 12189 (2006).
145. See, e.g., Waterstone, supra note 13, at 1829 (study finding that “success at trial is noticeably
less pro-defendant for Titles II and III than Title I”).
146. Id. at 1837 (finding 6% of plaintiffs lose at the appellate level on this basis).
147. See Craig S. Lerner, “Accommodations” for the Learning Disabled: A Level Playing Field or
Affirmative Action for Elites?, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1043, 1078 (2004) (stating that “universities and other
institutions of higher learning, when approached by the learning disabled in pursuit of accommodations,
often decline to make the threshold challenge that the students are not, as a matter of law, ‘disabled,’ and
therefore not legally entitled to accommodations of any sort”).
148. See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (2008); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (2008).
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limitation in this activity.149 All evidence suggests that this number
will continue to grow as an increasing number of matriculating
students will have received accommodations throughout secondary
school.150 The critical mass of students in this category, however, has
not guaranteed their acceptance either on campus or in court. Judicial
skepticism that a student can be both substantially limited in learning
and academically successful at the same time has made it quite
difficult for these students to qualify for legal protection under the
ADA.
Once again, the substantial limitation requirement has operated as
the primary impediment to class membership in this area. The
Supreme Court’s decisions in Sutton and Albertson’s, Inc. v.
Kirkingburg151 have made it difficult for these students, like most
plaintiffs, to establish the degree of limitation necessary to establish a
protected disability. Many individuals with learning disabilities,
particularly those with Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder
(ADHD), achieve at least moderate control over some aspects of their
impairments through the use of medication.152 The Court made clear
in Kirkingburg, moreover, that courts must consider all conscious and
subconscious self-help measures undertaken by a plaintiff, including
the body’s internal coping mechanisms, in making the disability

149. See Michael J. Ward, The Picture of College Freshmen in Greater Focus: An Analysis of
Selected Characteristics by Types of Disabilities, HEATH RESOURCE CENTER, Aug. 2007, available at
http://www.heath.gwu.edu/index.php/News-Stories-from-Previous-Site/The-Picture-of-CollegeFreshmen-in-Greater-Focus-An-Analysis-of-Selected-Characteristics-by-Types-o.html (discussing a
2004 study finding that “more freshmen with learning disabilities enter college (35,772) than in the past
and they make up a larger percentage of the students with disabilities population (41.8%)”). See also
Lerner, supra note 147, at 1073 (quoting a study finding that 2.5% of the college population as a whole
self-identifies as learning disabled).
150. See, e.g., Wendy F. Hensel, Sharing the Short Bus: Eligibility and Identity Under the IDEA, 58
HASTINGS L.J. 1147, 1150 (2007) (discussing the rise in eligibility under the IDEA for learning
disabilities); Nicholas L. Townsend, Framing a Ceiling as a Floor: The Changing Definition of
Learning Disabilities and the Conflicting Trends in Legislation Affecting Learning Disabled Students,
40 CREIGHTON L. REV. 229, 233–34 (2007) (discussing the rising number of students with learning
disabilities in higher education).
151. Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555 (1999).
152. See Lerner, supra note 147, at 1090 (noting that “persons suffering from certain learning
disabilities, in particular those falling under the general heading of ADD/ADHD, are now widely
medicated”).
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determination.153 As a result, the success of any intentional or
unintentional learning strategy employed by these students has
simultaneously served to undermine their access to legal protection
under the ADA.
Students with learning disabilities are also impeded by the DOJ’s
direction that courts consider the degree of limitation posed by an
impairment in relation to “most people.”154 The problem for most
students in higher education, particularly those in graduate or
professional school, is that they have attained a level of educational
achievement which surpasses the majority of Americans. Some large
cities have nearly 50% of their students drop out of high school with
no diploma,155 and nationally less than one-third of all adults attain
college degrees.156 There is abundant evidence that the average
person cannot read at a high school level, let alone at a collegiate
one.157 Against this background, a college or professional student’s
claim that he or she is significantly restricted in learning vis-à-vis a
typical adult appears weak at best.
In part, this difficulty has arisen because of the differences
between the medical and legal definitions of learning disability.
Historically, medical professionals have diagnosed learning
disabilities when psychological testing reflects a substantial
discrepancy between a student’s intellectual capabilities and his
153. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. at 565–66.
154. See 28 C.F.R. pt. 36, app. B (2008) (finding a person substantially limited “when the individual’s
important life activities are restricted as to the conditions, manner, or duration under which they can be
performed in comparison to most people”). See also Wong v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 379 F.3d 1097,
1109 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding that medical student’s ability to achieve academically in early years of
program demonstrated that he “is not less able to ‘learn’ than most people”).
155. Ruth Curran Neild, Scott Stoner-Eby & Frank Furstenberg, Connecting Entrance and Departure:
The Transition To Ninth Grade and High School Dropout, 40 EDUC. & URB. SOC’Y 543, 543 (July
2008).
156. Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau News, One-Third of Young Women Have Bachelor’s
Degrees (Jan. 28, 2008), available at
http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/education/011196.html.
157. See, e.g., B.D. Weiss et al., Communicating with Patients Who Cannot Read, 337 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 272 (1997) (discussing 1992 finding that an estimated “40 million to 44 million people, or about
one quarter of the adult population in the United States, cannot understand written materials that require
only very basic proficiency in reading. These people would generally be unable to read and understand
instructions on medication bottles or household cleaning solutions, notes from a child’s teacher, or
directions on a map.”).
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actual academic performance.158 This standard does not reference
external norms in the population like the DOJ regulations, but instead
focuses on the internal subjective abilities of a particular individual.
Under the DOJ’s definition, any evidence of even mediocre
performance will be sufficient to negate a claim of disability. Under
the latter definition, evidence of even superior performance will not
be sufficient to negate a claim of disability where the individual is
capable of even greater academic achievement.
Some plaintiffs have identified the components of learning as
major life activities, such as reading, writing, thinking, concentrating,
and studying, in order to overcome this difficulty.159 This approach,
however, has not been widely successful. Although some courts have
found writing and reading to be major life activities, most have
rejected thinking, concentrating and studying as insufficiently narrow
to qualify independently as “major”.160 More problematically,
students experience the same difficulties establishing comparative
limitations in the components of academic performance that they
experience in the broader category of learning.161 Because, on the
whole, their skills exceed those of the average person in the general
population, they are unable to establish a substantial limitation in
even these more narrow activities.
Two cases that are often cited for their treatment of students with
learning disabilities under the ADA demonstrate the divergent
approaches taken by courts when resolving claims made by
158. See, e.g., Suzanne Wilhelm, Accommodating Mental Disabilities in Higher Education: A
Practical Guide to ADA Requirements, 32 J. LAW & EDUC. 217, 229–30 (2003) (describing discrepancy
model); Lerner, supra note 147, at 1088–89.
159. See, e.g., Szmaj v. AT&T, 291 F.3d 955, 956 (7th Cir. 2002) (reading all day long); Thornton v.
McClatchy Newspapers, Inc., 292 F.3d 1045, 1046 (9th Cir. 2002) (continuous keyboarding and
handwriting); Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam’rs, 226 F.3d 69, 80 (2d Cir. 2000) (learning,
reading, writing, studying, test-taking and working); Gonzales v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 225 F.3d
620, 627–30 (6th Cir. 2000) (reading and writing); Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 307
(3d Cir. 1999) (thinking); Pack v. Kmart Corp., 166 F.3d 1300, 1304–05 (10th Cir. 1999)
(concentrating).
160. See, e.g., Taylor, 184 F.3d at 307; Pack, 166 F.3d at 1305.
161. See, e.g., Wong v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 379 F.3d 1097, 1110 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding
academically talented medical student not substantially limited in reading because “the relationship
between reading and academic success is sufficiently close to make that argument a difficult one to
maintain”); Gonzales, 225 F.3d at 627–30 (6th Cir. 2000).
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academically talented students. In Price v. National Board of Medical
Examiners, 162 three students with learning disabilities sued the
NBME seeking extra time on the medical bar exam as well as a
separate testing room. All three claimed to have ADHD, and two
claimed to also have reading disorders and disorders of written
expression, characterized by the court as “specific learning
disabilities.”163 None had received academic accommodations in high
school or college.164 Although each plaintiff submitted
documentation from medical professionals supporting their
diagnoses, the court nevertheless concluded that none could establish
that their impairments substantially limited the major life activity of
learning.165 Referring to DOJ regulations, the court reasoned that it
was required to compare the plaintiffs’ functioning to that of “most
people.”166 Because “each of the students has a history of significant
scholastic achievement . . . corroborated by standardized test scores
measuring cognitive ability and performance,” the court found no
evidence that they could not learn “at least as well as the average
person.”167 This holding has subsequently been cited to suggest that a
plaintiff’s status as a graduate student is virtually sufficient, standing
alone, to negate class membership on the basis of learning
disabilities.168
The Second Circuit in Bartlett v. New York State Board of Law
Examiners,169 on the other hand, favored a careful, individualized
assessment of the plaintiff’s limitations regardless of her general
162. Price v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 966 F. Supp. 419 (S.D.W.V. 1997).
163. Id. at 422–23.
164. Id. at 423–24.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 426 (internal citations omitted)
167. Id. at 427–28.
168. See, e.g., Wong v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 379 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 2004) (describing
district court’s finding that medical student’s “prior academic success, which won him admission to
medical school and which continued through the first two years of medical school, was . . . fatally
inconsistent with his claim to be disabled”); Steere v. George Wash. Univ. Sch. of Med. & Health Scis.,
439 F. Supp.2d 17, 21-23 (D.D.C. 2006) (concluding that medical student did not have a disability, in
part, because he “enjoyed a great deal of academic success throughout his life . . . and performed
extremely well in many subjects”). See also Lerner, supra note 147, at 1089.
169. Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam’rs, 156 F.3d 321 (2d Cir. 2000).
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success in academic settings. In that case, the plaintiff, a Ph.D. who
had also completed her law degree, claimed that she was disabled on
the basis of dyslexia, a reading disorder. She repeatedly applied to
take the New York state bar exam, requesting that she be given
unlimited or extended time, permission to tape record her essays, and
permission to circle her test answers in the booklet rather than on the
testing sheet.170 Each time the Board denied her request, finding that
she did not have a legal disability and thus was not entitled to
accommodation under the ADA.171 The Second Circuit disagreed,
holding that the self-help and adapted learning strategies that she
employed to achieve academic success should be excluded from the
evaluation of whether she was substantially limited in a major life
activity.172
As a consequence of the Supreme Court’s decision in Sutton, the
case was remanded to the district court for reconsideration. That
court concluded that the plaintiff was not substantially limited in the
major life activities of reading or learning because her “history of
self-accommodation ‘ha[d] allowed her to achieve . . . roughly
average reading skills (on some measures) when compared to the
general population.’”173 The Second Circuit, however, once again
disagreed, reasoning that even if the plaintiff had “average skills on
‘some’ measures,” she nevertheless could qualify as disabled if “her
skills are below average on other measures to an extent that her
ability to read is substantially limited.”174 The court justified this
conclusion post-Sutton on the basis that “[s]low reading speed is
170. Id. at 324.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 329.
173. Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam’rs, No. 93 CIV. 4986(SS), 2001 WL 930792, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. 2001). The court also found that the plaintiff was substantially limited in the major life
activity of work because she compared unfavorably with persons of “comparable training, skills and
abilities.” Id. (citing Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam’rs (Bartlett I), 970 F. Supp. 1094, 1121
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (internal citations omitted)). The Second Circuit, however, overruled this finding.
Bartlett, 226 F.3d at 82 (2d. Cir. 2000). Although the court agreed that the practice of law qualified as a
“class of jobs,” it remanded the decision for further consideration of whether plaintiff’s reading
impairment, rather than other factors, was a substantial factor in her inability to pass the bar. Id. at 83–
84.
174. Bartlett, 226 F.3d at 81.

Published by Reading Room, 2009

35

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 3 [2009], Art. 7

676

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25:3

clearly a condition or manner that can present a substantial
limitation—unlike, perhaps, wearing contact lenses.”175 Accordingly,
Bartlett stands for the proposition that past evidence of academic
achievement is not sufficient, standing alone, to negate the claim that
a student is substantially limited in learning. Instead, courts are
required to take a careful look at the method and manner in which the
plaintiff achieves her academic success.176
2. Legislative History of Learning Disabilities under the ADAAA
The legislative history of the ADAAA repeatedly references
Congress’ desire to reject the position articulated in Price and its
progeny and affirm the Second Circuit’s approach in Bartlett.177 The
Congressional record and the Report of the House Committee on
Education and Labor, for example, both conclude that “it is critical to
reject the assumption that an individual who performs well
academically or otherwise cannot be substantially limited in activities
such as learning, reading, writing, thinking, or speaking.”178
Although the report does not reject courts’ comparison of individuals
with learning disabilities to “most people,” it cautions that this
inquiry “requires a careful analysis of the method and manner” in
which the major life activity is performed, referencing dyslexics’
need to read slowly word-for-word.179 The Report of the House
Judiciary Committee seconds this approach, directing courts to
evaluate future claims of learning disabilities by evaluating whether a
plaintiff’s acts of self-accommodation “restricted [him] as to the
condition, manner or duration under which [he] performed” the
respective academic activities.180
175. Id. (finding it significant that plaintiff “‘read . . . slowly, haltingly, and laboriously.’”) (citing
Bartlett I, 970 F. Supp. at 1099).
176. Id. at 86.
177. See, e.g., 154 CONG. REC. H8290–91 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2008); H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 1, at
10 (2008) (rejecting Price, Gonzales and Wong); H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 1, at 10 (2008).
178. See 154 CONG. REC. S8346 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2008) and H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 1, at 10
(2008).
179. H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 1, at 10–11 (2008).
180. H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 2, at 21 (2008).
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Several legislators also made pointed references to the ADAAA’s
impact on individuals with learning disabilities during the legislative
debate. Representative Fortney Stark, for example, held the following
exchange with Representative George Miller:
Mr. STARK.
I am pleased that this bill, S.3406, will sustain the rights and
remedies available to individuals with disabilities, including
individuals with learning disabilities just as in the measure
passed by the House, H.R. 3195.
Would the Chairman agree that the measure before us rejects
the assumption that an individual who has performed well
academically cannot be substantially limited in activities such as
learning reading, writing, thinking, or speaking?
Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California.
Yes, I would. As chairman of the Education and Labor
Committee, I agree that both H.R. 3195 and S. 3406 reject the
holding that academic success is inconsistent with the finding
that an individual is substantially limited in such major life
activities. As such, we reject the findings in Price v. National
Board of Medical Examiners, Gonzalez v. National Board of
Medical Examiners, and Wong v. Regents of University of
California.
Mr. STARK.
I thank the Chairman. Specific learning disabilities, such as
dyslexia, are neurologically based impairments that substantially
limit the way these individuals perform major life activities, like
reading or learning, or the time it takes to perform such activities
often referred to as the condition, manner, or duration.
This legislation will reestablish coverage for these individuals
by ensuring that the definition of this ability is broadly construed
and the determination does not consider the use of mitigating
measures.
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Given this, would the chairman agree that these amendments
support the finding in Bartlett v. New York State Board of Law
Examiners in which the court held that in determining whether
the plaintiff was substantially limited with respect to reading,
Bartlett’s ability to ‘‘self-accommodate’’ should not be taken
into consideration when determining whether she was protected
by the ADA?
Mr. GEORGE MILLER of California.
Yes, I would. As we stated in the committee report on H.R.
3195, the committee supports the finding in Bartlett. Our report
explains that ‘‘an individual with an impairment that
substantially limits a major life activity should not be penalized
when seeking protection under the ADA simply because he or
she managed their own adaptive strategies or received informal
or undocumented accommodations that have the effect of
lessening the deleterious impacts of their disability.’’181

Representative Joe Courtney also applauded the bill’s extension to
this community, arguing that “[t]oo many individuals with
documented learning disabilities . . . are denied access to easily
administered and often low-cost accommodations that would make
the critical difference in allowing them to demonstrate their
knowledge. These amendments . . . ensure that each individual with a
learning disability has every opportunity . . . [to] move forward in
his/her chosen educational and career paths.”182
Not everyone, however, applauded this aspect of the Amendments.
During the hearings on the legislation, eight organizations involved in
standardized testing and higher education, including the ACT,
National Board of Medical Examiners, and National Conference of
Bar Examiners, expressed concern that the legislation could
adversely affect entities with obligations under Titles II and III of the
181. 154 CONG. REC. H8290–91 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 2008).
182. Id. at H8296.
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ADA.183 They argued that the number of students seeking
accommodation for standardized testing would increase as a result of
the legislation, a problematic result because “[t]he provision of such
accommodations—especially extra testing time—can affect the
comparability of the resulting scores[.]”184 They noted that “the vast
majority of accommodation requests have been based upon LD
and/or ADHD diagnoses[,]” both of which are difficult to confirm
and difficult to assess in terms of reasonable accommodation.185 They
pointed to a significant “risk of misdiagnosis” in these categories
from “flaws in the[ir] diagnostic models” and the incentives to
exaggerate in order to secure preferential treatment.186 As a result,
they predicted that passage of the ADAAA in its current form not
only would threaten the public with potentially unqualified
professionals, but also would increase costs for schools and
universities because of new requests for support services and
subsequent litigation.187
The organizations also characterized the inclusion of thinking and
concentrating as major life activities as “extremely problematic in an
instructional or testing context” because it would unfairly result in
accommodations for students not substantially limited in their overall
ability to learn.188 The entities argued that they should be permitted to
include “learned behavioral or adaptive neurological modifications”
in evaluating disability because behavioral changes needed to do well
academically, such as studying longer and working particularly hard,
are simply “a normal part of life for everyone” and relevant to an
assessment of limitation.189

183. Letter from ACT, supra note 99, at 2. The letter was also signed by the Law School Admission
Council, Association of American Medical Colleges, Federation of State Medical Boards of the United
States, Inc., Graduate Management Admission Council, and National Council of Examiners for
Engineering and Surveying. Id. at 5.
184. Id. at 3.
185. Id. at Attachment B.II.
186. Id.
187. Id. at Attachment B.IV.
188. Letter from ACT, supra note 99, at Attachment C.I.
189. Id. at Attachment C.II.
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Congress, however, was not persuaded by these arguments and did
not alter the disability definition in the ADAAA. It did, however,
attempt to alleviate the concerns of higher education by adding a
provision in the legislation reaffirming that public accommodations
are not required to provide modifications that would fundamentally
alter the nature of the goods or services of the institution, including,
explicitly, “academic requirements in postsecondary education.”190
The Report of the House Committee on Education and Labor
likewise confirms that colleges and universities do not need “to
eliminate academic requirements essential to the instruction being
pursued by a student,” but counsels that they may need “to make
modifications in order to enable students with disabilities to meet
those academic requirements,”191 like “changes in the length of time
permitted for the completion of degree requirements, substitution of
specific courses required for the completion of degree requirements,
and adaptation of the manner in which specific courses are
conducted.”192 The Report also states that Congress intends to permit
institutions of higher education and licensing boards to continue to
require “appropriate and reasonable” documentation in order to
determine eligibility under the Act.193
One Senator also added his voice to the concern that the ADAAA
not be read to override the discretion of professional licensing boards.
Senator John Barrasso, a physician, reasoned that “[i]t is vital that
standardized testing organizations not be required to fundamentally
alter key performance measurements when providing reasonable
accommodations to students with disabilities.”194 He contended that
the decision “whether an accommodation is reasonable should be left
to the licensing board,” at least in the context of physicians.195
Because of the potential public health implications, he advocated that
190. ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No.110-325 § 6, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (amending 42
U.S.C. § 12201(f)).
191. H.R. REP. NO. 110-730, pt. 1, at 11 (2008).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. 154 CONG. REC. S8355 (daily ed. Sept. 11, 2008).
195. Id.
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“[w]hen a testing organization or a licensing board has made a
decision in good faith about an appropriate accommodation, the
decision should be given great deference.”196
3. Future Impact on Higher Education
The ADAAA’s repeal of Sutton and statutory recognition of
thinking, concentrating, reading, and communicating as major life
activities will undoubtedly increase the number of students with
learning disabilities who qualify for legal protection. The ultimate
impact of this expansion, however, is unclear at this point. Many
colleges and universities in the past have taken a broader approach to
disability than the law requires when responding to requests for
accommodation by students. Some disability coordinators in colleges
and universities have focused on whether the accommodations would
“enable the individual student to realize his or her full academic
potential” rather than whether they are legally required or likely to
impact “the integrity of a school’s academic program.”197 In these
institutions, there may be little appreciable change as a result of the
revised legislation.
Even if the ranks of students with disabilities remain relatively
constant, however, there is little doubt that disputes will continue to
arise over some students’ coverage under the ADA. Although the
ADAAA will provide guidance in many cases, significant ambiguity
remains in the wake of the amendments. Colleges and universities
will continue to struggle with the meaning of “substantial limitation”
and the actionable line between minimal and severe effects.198 The
196. Id.
197. Tracey I. Levy, Legal Obligations and Workplace Implications for Institutions of Higher
Education Accommodating Learning Disabled Students, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 85, 86 (2001) (explaining that
disability coordinators are typically clinicians “with little or no training in the actual legal requirements
of the federal anti-discrimination laws”). See also Lerner, supra note 147, at 1117–22.
198. See Council on Law in Higher Education, The ADA Amendments Act: Overview and Analysis,
available at http://www.clhe.org/clhe/wp-content/uploads/2009/01/eiada2008.pdf (September, 2008)
(“Unless more clarity is provided in the legislation, there will be significant confusion as to what
constitutes ‘significantly limits.’ This would be one of the core issues colleges and universities would
have to wrestle with when complying with the changes to the ADA.”).
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requirement that students with disabilities be compared to the “most
people” stands unaltered, and it is unclear how courts will apply this
language going forward. Although Congress’ direction to interpret
disability broadly is helpful to some extent, those courts unfamiliar
with the legislative history of the ADAAA or unwilling to consider
its direction are left with significant discretion.
With respect to those students covered by the ADAAA, litigation
in this area will increasingly focus on the appropriate scope of legally
required accommodations. In the past, courts have given significant
deference to institutions’ academic judgment.199 In Wynne v. Tufts
University School of Medicine, for example, the First Circuit held that
if an institution fully considers the availability, feasibility, and cost of
all modifications and makes “a rationally justifiable conclusion that
[an accommodation] would result either in lowering academic
standards or requiring substantial program alteration,” the duty of
reasonable accommodation is satisfied as a matter of law.200 There is
no question that the legislative changes will result in renewed
attention to this standard and the ADA’s accommodation imperative.
The first appellate case to consider the treatment of learning
disabilities under the ADAAA confirms this conclusion. In Jenkins v.
National Board of Medical Examiners,201 the plaintiff, a third-year
medical student, was diagnosed with a reading disorder early in life
and had received accommodations throughout his academic career.202
He petitioned the NBME for accommodations on his medical board
examinations and, following the NBME’s refusal to award them,
filed for an injunction in district court. The district court heard
extensive evidence from plaintiff’s medical expert and concluded that
it was “clear from the record” that the plaintiff “does not read at the
same rate as many, if not most people,” and that the condition “has
unquestionably made it more difficult for [him] to keep up with a
199. Barbara A. Lee & Gail E. Abbey, College and University Students with Mental Disabilities:
Legal and Policy Issues, 34 J.C. & U.L. 349, 368 (2008).
200. Wynne v. Tufts Univ. Sch. of Med., 932 F.2d 19, 26 (1st Cir. 1991) (en banc).
201. Jenkins v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Exam’rs (Jenkins II), No. 08-5371, 2009 WL 331638 (6th Cir. Feb.
11, 2009).
202. Id. at *1.
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rigorous medical school curriculum and to succeed on written tests
where he is under time constraints.”203 Judging by the “average
person’s life” rather than a “medical student’s life,” however, the
court, relying on Toyota, concluded that the plaintiff could not
establish a substantial limitation because he was still able to perform
reading tasks “central to daily life,” such as reading a newspaper or
menu.204
The ADAAA went into effect before the Sixth Circuit heard the
case on appeal. In an unpublished opinion, the court concluded that
the revised statute applied because the plaintiff sought the “right to
receive an accommodation on a test that will occur in the future”
rather than damages for prior acts of discrimination.205 The court
remanded the case for reconsideration in light of the ADAAA, noting
that “the categorical threshold scope of the ADA’s coverage has been
broadened.”206 Although the court declined to provide further
clarification of the new legislation, it counseled that the “breadth” of
the revised definition of disability “heightens the importance of the
district
courts’
responsibility
to
fashion
appropriate
207
accommodations.” It cautioned the lower court that even if it found
the plaintiff to be disabled, it still must
determine specifically what NBME must do to comply with the
requirement that a professional licensing board offer its
examination “in a place and manner accessible to persons with
disabilities.” This nuanced determination is not governed by
previous, voluntarily provided accommodations that Jenkins has
received, nor necessarily by what accommodations were required
under the narrower previous definition of disability.208

203. Jenkins v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Exam’rs (Jenkins I), No. 3:07-CV-698-H, 2008 WL 410237, at *1
(W.D. Ky. Feb. 12, 2008).
204. Id. at *2–3.
205. Jenkins II, 2009 WL 331638, at *1.
206. Id. at *4.
207. Id.
208. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12189).
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The court provided no insight into the more difficult question—how
courts under the new legislation should balance an individual
student’s need for accommodation against the need to maintain the
integrity of higher education and licensing exams. This complicated
issue is likely to pose a continuing challenge for administrators and
courts in the foreseeable future.
C. Eligibility and Academic Accommodations in Elementary and
Secondary Schools
The ADAAA will undoubtedly expand eligibility for students with
disabilities in elementary and secondary school seeking
accommodations pursuant to § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. This
may prove to be problematic for schools, particularly in the context
of children with learning disabilities. The newly liberal § 504
eligibility standards are in tension with the restrictive threshold
interpretation that some courts and administrative hearing officers
have given to learning disabilities under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).209 This conflict has the potential
to result in confusion for administrators and the inconsistent
treatment of similarly situated children.
1. § 504 and Child Find Obligations in K-12
There is no question that the broader definition of disability
adopted in the ADAAA will expand eligibility under § 504 to at least
some extent. Administrative hearing officers and courts have cited
Sutton in several cases finding that the major life activities of these
students were insufficiently limited to establish coverage under the
Rehabilitation Act. One case, for example, involved a student with
severe asthma who ultimately died from an asthma attack at
school.210 The court reasoned that the student was not substantially
limited in a major life activity because, with the use of his inhaler, his
209. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–91 (2006).
210. Garcia v. Northside Indep. Sch. Dist., No. SA-05-CA-0218 FB(NN), 2007 WL 26803, at *1
(W.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2007).
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“breathing was regulated to such a degree that he succeeded in
school, played with friends like a normal child, and participated in a
wide range of physical activities.”211 Similar logic has been used to
deny eligibility to students with severe allergies, ADHD, diabetes and
other impairments.212 These students and others with disorders that
are relatively well controlled on medication will have a significantly
better chance of securing § 504 coverage as a result of the new
legislation.
The future treatment of students with learning disabilities is more
uncertain. Not surprisingly, the logic articulated by courts in a higher
education context has extended as well to K-12 students seeking
protection for learning disabilities. Students performing at or above
grade level generally have not been able to show a substantial
limitation in learning under § 504 even when they take significantly
longer to complete assignments, use medication, or employ
significant self-help strategies to achieve academic success. 213 This
has occurred both as a result of Sutton’s direction to consider
211. Id. at *4.
212. See, e.g., Kropp v. Me. Sch. Admin.Union #44, Civil No. 06-81-P-S., 2007 WL 551516, at *17
(D. Me. Feb. 16, 2007) (“For a typical asthmatic treated with corticosteroids . . . , it can be very difficult
to demonstrate a substantial limitation in the ability to breathe.”); Block v. Rockford Pub. Sch. Dist., No.
01 C 50133, 2002 WL 31856719, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 2002) (finding student not disabled on the
basis of asthma and allergies where disorder was controlled through inhaler); Smith v. Tangipahoa
Parish Sch. Bd., No. 05-6648, 2006 WL 3395938, at *8 (E.D. La. Nov. 22, 2006) (finding student with
severe allergies who took daily medications and carried an EpiPen at all times not substantially limited
in breathing because there was only the “potential” for a severe reaction in some circumstances);
Hopkinton Pub. Sch., 105 LRP 34753, at *12, (Mass. SEA July 19, 2005) (reversing school’s finding
that student with ADHD was no longer substantially limited in the major life activity of learning based
on her academic success where success was achieved only through accommodations previously offered
by school); Gloucester County Pub. Sch., 49 IDELR 21, at *1 (OCR Jan. 28, 2007) (rejecting school’s
finding that student with severe nut allergy that could result in death was not eligible under § 504);
Marshall v. Sisters of Holy Family of Nazareth, 399 F. Supp. 2d 597, 605 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (finding no
disability where student with moderate behavioral problems performed well academically).
213. See, e.g., Jefferson County Pub. Sch., 37 IDELR 127 (OCR Apr. 15, 2002) (denying eligibility
where student tested in the average range); Narragansett Sch. Comm., 105 LRP 20240 (RI SEA Sept.
16, 2004) (finding student with learning disabilities not substantially limited compared to average
students). See also Proper Scope of Coverage for the Americans with Disabilities Act: Testimony Before
the Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, & Pensions, at *3, 110th Cong. (2008) (testimony of Sue
Gamm) [hereinafter Gamm Testimony], available at http://dataserver.lrp.com/DATA/servlet/
DataServlet?fname=061408sgsenate.pdf (noting a “long time practice by school districts across the
country” denying § 504 eligibility to students with learning disabilities who are “performing adequately
in the classroom and school generally”).
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mitigating measures and because of the requirement that students
demonstrate a substantial limitation in learning in comparison to the
average child. In Needham Public Schools, for example, a high
school student diagnosed with “mild dyscalculia and weaknesses in
executive functioning and processing speed” sought extended time
for in-class tests.214 The school conceded that she needed the
additional time to complete her tests, and her parents argued that she
“compensates for her documented learning disability by spending an
inordinate amount of time on homework and extra credit assignments
to make up for poor test grades.”215 Despite this evidence, the hearing
officer concluded that she did not have a disability because “Section
504 calls for comparing Student’s functioning to the average person
her age, not her own potential given accommodations.”216 The officer
reasoned that
even if Student struggles with completing some tests or
assignments in a timely manner [or] . . . her problems with
executive functioning prevent her from achieving to her
maximum potential on timed tests, or . . . cause[] her to
occasionally fail tests, her overall skill level and performance is
as good as or better than that of the average student her age.217

The hearing officer refused to consider whether plaintiff’s selfaccommodating measures should be taken into consideration because
there was “insufficient evidence of whether and how the amount of
time Student spends on school work is excessive.”218
Many of the cases denying eligibility to academically-talented
plaintiffs because of the success of mitigating measures employed are
in tension with the position adopted by the Office Civil Rights
(OCR), the agency within the Department of Education charged with
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Needham Pub. Sch., 106 LRP 32299, at *1 (MA SEA May 30, 2006).
Id.
Id. at *10.
Id. at *9.
Id.
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enforcing § 504 in elementary and secondary schools.219 In 2000,
OCR issued an Investigative Guidance for enforcement offices on the
impact of Sutton.220 The Guidance makes clear that a distinction
should be made between a school’s obligation to provide a free
appropriate public education under § 504 and an employer’s
obligation to provide reasonable accommodation under the ADA. It
explains that “[a] mitigating measure is a device or practice that a
student uses on his or her own to reduce or eliminate the effects of
the student’s impairment . . . without any action or assistance by the
school.”221 If a learning modification is provided by or under the
control of the educational institution, the Guidance precludes its
consideration in evaluating eligibility. As a result, schools are
required to ignore “the impact of reasonable modifications, academic
adjustments, auxiliary aids and services, or related aids and
services . . . when evaluating whether a student’s impairment
substantially limits a major life activity.”222
The ADAAA’s potential to expand coverage under § 504 beyond
even this relaxed approached raised concerns among schools and
administrators during the legislative process. On July 14, 2008, the
Senate Committee on Health Education, Labor, and Pensions heard
testimony from Sue Gamm,223 an educational consultant, on the bill’s
potential impact on elementary and secondary schools. She argued
that Sutton’s rejection, combined with the expansion of coverage to
students with learning disabilities performing at or above grade level,
“could have a profound impact on the legal obligations of elementary
schools.” 224 She contended that the legislation would significantly
increase the cost of child-find activities because it requires more
evaluations, assessments and accommodations, all of which carry the
219. See 34 C.F.R. § 104.31 et seq.
220. OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, SUTTON INVESTIGATIVE GUIDANCE: CONSIDERATION OF “MITIGATING
MEASURES” IN OCR DISABILITY CASES, 1 (Sept. 29, 2000), http://www.diabetes.org/uedocuments/
Sutton_Investigative_Guidance.pdf.
221. Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
222. Id. at 4.
223. Gamm testified “Representing the Interests of Elementary and Secondary Education Public
Consulting Group.” Gamm Testimony, supra note 213.
224. Id. at *1.
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potential for increased litigation against school districts.225 She noted
particular concern with the “very large numbers of nonproficient
readers” in most schools, many of whom experience difficulty
because of poor classroom instruction rather than learning
disabilities.226 She argued that a relaxed standard of disability “could
very well open a flood gate of Section 504 eligibility” by extending
legal protection to all of these students.227 Because schools already
make informal arrangements to assist students with health problems,
and only a limited number of cases have been brought under § 504,
she concluded that the current law was adequate to protect the needs
of K-12 students.228
Congress, however, was not persuaded by these concerns. The
ADAAA makes clear that schools evaluating eligibility under § 504
are no longer permitted to refer to any mitigating measures employed
by the student, regardless of whether such measures come in the form
of medication, assistive technology, or self-help measures. The
student who has severe asthma will likely be covered despite his use
of an inhaler, and the student capable of high levels of academic
achievement now at least has the opportunity to secure legal
protection on the basis of a learning disability. Schools necessarily
will need to change their eligibility evaluation procedures to the
extent they are inconsistent with these new standards.
The ultimate impact of this change, however, is again uncertain.
One expert has concluded that the number of students receiving
accommodations pursuant to § 504 is likely to expand significantly,
perhaps even doubling as a result of the ADAAA.229 Coverage may
increase not only because of the adoption of a broader understanding
of substantial limitation, but also because the formal inclusion of
225. Id. at *1–2.
226. Id. at *4.
227. Id. at *6.
228. Id. at *1.
229. Specialedconnection.com, House passes ADA Amendments Act to Mixed Reviews – Sept. 17
2008, http://www.specialedconnection.com/LrpSecStoryTool/servlet/GetStory?docid=4956397&printer=1
(last visited Mar. 12, 2009) (comments of Bruce Hunter, Associate Executive Director of the American
Association of School Administrators).
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thinking and communicating as major life activities may facilitate
eligibility for students who cannot show limitation in the more
expansive category of learning.230 Although there are relatively few
reported cases on eligibility under § 504,231 it may be misleading to
rely on these numbers because parents only rarely file formal
challenges to school districts’ decisions, and most that are filed are
resolved prior to formal resolution.232 At a minimum, those school
districts with a past practice of routinely denying coverage to any
student with learning disabilities performing near grade level should
see a meaningful increase in coverage under the ADAAA.233
Some commentators, however, believe that the new law will have
little impact overall for elementary and secondary schools. Many
schools have provided 504 plans to students more readily than the
law has required.234 Few 504 teams include attorneys schooled in
disability law, and the focus in eligibility determinations is often on
230. Specialedconnection.com, Efforts to Broaden Scope of “Disability” Could Create Larger Pool of
504 Students –June 24, 2008 http://www.specialedconnection.com/LrpSecStoryTool/servlet/GetStory?
docid=4802297&printer=1 (last visited Mar. 12, 2009) (comments of Attorney Gary Ruesch).
231. See, e.g., Gamm Testimony, supra note 213, at * 1 (noting “the dearth of litigation or OCR
activity in the area of Section 504/ADA eligibility for elementary and secondary education students”).
232. Although there is little evidence available on this point in the context of § 504 disputes, a recent
study found “more than 80 percent of requests for due process—a legal remedy outlined in the federal
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act—never get to the point at which a hearing is held.” Christine
A. Samuels, States Found Moving to Head Off Due Process Hearings, 27 EDUC. WEEK 12 (June 13,
2008). See also Posting of Charles Fox to Special Education Law Blog, http://specialedlaw.blogs.com/
home/parent_advocacy/ (Aug. 3, 2008, 12: 37 EST) ( “The simple reality is that parents file due process
in incredibly small numbers relative to the violations of the law that occur systematically and
frequently.”).
233. See Gamm Testimony, supra note 213, at *3. See also Specialedconnection.com, Experts Weigh
In on Key Provisions of ADA Amendments Act – Oct. 3, 2008, http://www.specialedconnection.com/
LrpSecStoryTool/servlet/GetStory?docid=4994360&printer=1 (last visited Mar. 12, 2009). Jeff
Simering, legislative counsel for Council of Great City Schools, argued that “[i]t’s disingenuous for
people to continue to propound the concept that these changes in the ADA are going to have almost no
effect on elementary and secondary schools.” Id.
234. See, e.g., Specialedconnection.com, Disability Advocates Defend ADA Bill, Call Section 504
Fears Unwarranted – June 20, 2008, http://www.specialedconnection.com/LrpSecStoryTool/
servlet/GetStory?docid=4797471&printer=1 (last visited Mar. 12, 2009). Ron Hager, Senior Staff
Attorney for National Disability Rights Network, commented that the law “really shouldn’t have that big
of an impact on schools. I never saw the school districts following that line of Sutton cases, in
determining who was a person with a disability.” Id. See also Rachel A. Holler & Perry A. Zirkel,
Section 504 and Public Schools: A National Survey Concerning “Section 504-Only Students,” 92
NASSP BULLETIN 19, 21 (Mar. 2008) (citing study speculating that “districts may be overidentifying
students under Section 504 from families at either extreme of socioeconomic status”).
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the instructional needs of the student without regard to the law’s
requirements, a parallel phenomenon to that experienced in higher
education.235 To some extent, moreover, there have been incentives
for school administrators to err on the side of over-inclusiveness
under § 504 because affixing a disability label to higher functioning
students can “help the principal make adequate yearly progress under
NCLB, assuage parents who seek extra testing time . . . [and] add[]
leverage to get teachers to differentiate instruction and otherwise
provide individually responsive adjustments to students.”236 Notably,
even if eligibility requests increase, the relatively small number of
students receiving services under § 504 in comparison to the IDEA
population suggests that schools will see, at most, a modest impact
from these changes.237
If there is a meaningful increase in the number of requests for
accommodation, it is most likely to occur at the high school level. A
504 plan for these students brings the potential for “shortened
homework assignments, additional and personalized assistance,
exemptions from otherwise required classes, and accommodations on
exams,” including the SAT and ACT.238 Although there is always
stigma attached to a label of disability, the 504 plan is often
perceived to carry less prejudice than would participation in special
education classes.239 As a result, some commentators and scholars
have speculated that 504 plans are “the vehicle of choice” for highincome parents seeking advantageous treatment for children on
standardized tests, particularly since the SAT voluntarily agreed to
235. See, e.g., Holler & Zirkel, supra note 234, at 34. The authors’ study found that 504 teams did not
follow “judicial interpretations of the Section 504 eligibility definition” and tended to over identify 504
students. They attribute this finding in part to the “professional orientations” of the 504 team, which
suggest that “the ‘right’ educational frame of reference” is to “look[] at the child’s potential and
analyz[e] the child’s functioning without mitigating measures[.]” Id. at 36.
236. Id. at 36–37.
237. See id. at 30 (study suggesting that “504-only students” represent approximately 1.2% of the
public school population).
238. Lerner, supra note 147, at 1075.
239. See, e.g., Perry A. Zirkel, Suspensions and Expulsions Under 504: A Comparative Overview, 226
WEST’S ED. L. RPT. 9, 11 n.18 (2008) (noting that schools at times will provide § 504 coverage to a
student eligible under the IDEA because of “parental perceptions of stigma” attached to special
education).
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cease its practice of flagging the test scores achieved under nonstandard conditions in 2003.240
Not all scholars and commentators, however, would agree with this
prediction. Many would reject both the conclusion that there is widespread abuse of accommodation requests and the belief that extra
time for students with learning disabilities provides an unfair
advantage on standardized tests.241 As a result, the ADAAA’s impact
on accommodation requests at the high school level should prove to
be a fruitful area for future study.
2. Tension Between ADAAA & IDEA’s Treatment of Learning
Disabilities
One little discussed aspect of the ADAAA’s broadened definition
of disability is the tension it creates between the identification of
learning disabilities under the IDEA and § 504. These two statutes
cover some, but not all, of the same students in public education.
Students who are eligible under the IDEA will virtually always be
covered under § 504 because they have an impairment which
substantially limits the major life activity of learning.242 The contrary,
240. Holler & Zirkel, supra note 234, at 21–22 (citing Los Angeles Times article reporting abuses by
“upper-income game players” who received extra time on the SAT through 504 plans); Letter from
ACT, supra note 99, at 3 (predicting that “[t]he number of individuals requesting accommodations” for
standardized testing “would increase” following passage of the ADAAA).
241. See, e.g., Hensel, supra note 150, at 1191–93; Mark Weber, The IDEA Eligibility Mess, 57 BUFF.
L. REV. 83, 126 (2009) (“It has . . . become clear that one common criticism of the LD concept, the
charge that rich parents buy LD diagnoses for their children in order to secure accommodations that
confer a competitive advantage in school, is an urban legend.”); Testimony of Jo Anne Simon, Esquire,
H.R. 3195 and Determining the Proper Scope of Coverage for the Americans with Disabilities Act
Before the Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, & Pensions, 110th Cong. (July 15, 2008) available at
http://help.senate.gov/Hearings/2008_ 07_15/2008_07_15.html (rejecting the “popular myth . . . that
students without disabilities seek accommodations on the SAT and other tests in order to achieve a
competitive edge on the test,” arguing that several scientific “studies have shown that students without
disabilities do not perform significantly better with extended time; students perform significantly better
with extended time only when they need the accommodations because of a learning disability.”). Cf.
Holler & Zirkel, supra note 234, at 33 (study finding “no significant difference in the percentage of 504only students with respect to school wealth”).
242. See, e.g., Letter to Veir, 20 IDELR 864, at *3 (OCR Dec. 1, 1993) (stating that the Office of
Civil Rights “cannot conceive of any situation” where a child would be eligible under the IDEA but not
under § 504); OCR Sutton Investigative Guidance, supra note 220, at 3 (when a school finds a student
eligible under the IDEA, this creates “a strong, although rebuttable, presumption that the condition, with
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however, is not true. Although some students receiving § 504
services will be covered under the IDEA, this generally will be the
exception rather than the rule.243
Despite these differences, one might expect significant overlap
between the statutes with respect to the identification and
accommodation of students with learning disabilities. One study
found that more than 25% of students receiving 504 plans qualify on
the basis that they are substantially limited in the major life activity
of learning.244 Likewise, approximately 45% of children receiving
services under the IDEA qualify on the basis of specific learning
disabilities.245 In practice, administrators applying either statute will
use the same definition when evaluating eligibility for these students
because OCR historically has relied upon the definition of specific
learning disabilities (SLD) that appears in the IDEA when assessing
eligibility under § 504.246
The IDEA defines SLD to mean “a disorder in one or more of the
basic psychological processes involved in understanding or in using
language, spoken or written, which disorder may manifest itself in the
imperfect ability to listen, think, speak, read, write, spell, or to do
mathematical calculations[.]”247 Following the reauthorization of the
IDEA in 2004, DOE regulations require the following showing in
order to establish a learning disability: (1) “the child does not achieve
adequately for the child’s age or to meet State-approved grade-level
standards in one or more of the enumerated areas;” (2) “[t]he child
does not make sufficient progress to meet age or State-approved
grade-level standards . . . when using a process based on the child’s
any mitigating measures used, is an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity such as
learning or reading”).
243. Holler & Zirkel, supra note 234, at 20.
244. Id. at 35.
245. Weber, supra note 241, at 123 (noting that children with learning disabilities comprise “about
45%” of all students eligible under the IDEA).
246. 34 C.F.R. pt. 104, app. A(3) (2007) (stating that OCR will interpret “specific learning
disabilities” “as it is used in Section 602 of the Education of Handicapped Act, as amended”). See also
Gamm Testimony, supra note 213, at *2 (noting that “[t]he OCR, U.S. Department of Education, has
historically relied upon the definition of a specific learning disability (SLD) provided in IDEA”).
247. 20 U.S.C. § 1401(30) (2006). See also 34 C.F.R. 300.8(c)(10) (2008).
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response to scientific, research-based intervention” or “exhibits a
pattern of strengths and weaknesses in performance, achievement, or
both . . . that is . . . relevant to the identification of a specific learning
disability,” and (3) other non-disability related reasons for these
difficulties are adequately eliminated.248
Despite the statutes’ reliance on the same definition, eligibility for
students with learning disabilities may vary significantly between the
statutes in the wake of the ADAAA. The Amendments make clear
that in evaluating whether an impairment substantially limits a child’s
ability to learn under the Rehabilitation Act, eligibility teams may not
consider the effects of mitigating measures taken by the student, such
as adaptive learning strategies, classroom modifications, and other
supports and services. The same is not always true in IDEA
eligibility cases. Some courts and administrative hearing officers
routinely consider the success of mitigating measures when
evaluating whether a child’s impairment “adversely affects” his
academic performance. If the child performs adequately with
supports and services in the classroom that do not technically meet
the definition of “special education,” 249 the child cannot establish the
required “adverse effect” on educational performance.250 Because
there is little agreement concerning which services qualify as “special
education,”251 this approach often results in the denial of eligibility
and fails to recognize that the child’s impairment must have affected
248. 34 C.F.R. 300.309(a).
249. The IDEA defines “special education” as “specially designed instruction, at no cost to parents, to
meet the unique needs of a child with a disability[.]” 20 U.S.C. § 1401(25). The regulations explain
that “specially designed instruction means adapting, as appropriate to the needs of an eligible child
under this part, the content, methodology, or delivery of instruction to meet the unique needs of a child
with a disability.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.39.
250. See, e.g., R.B. v. Napa Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 43 IDELR 188, 192 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (finding
no adverse effect on educational performance in part where plaintiff’s performance improved following
the implementation of a behavioral support plan under section 504); George West Indep. Sch. Dist., 35
IDELR 287, 288 (finding no adverse effect on educational performance where student was capable of
performing well academically in the classroom as the result of an amplification system provided
pursuant to § 504); Fenton Area Pub. Sch., 44 IDELR 223, 224 (Mich. SEA 1995) (finding
student ineligible where significant outside tutoring resulted in good academic performance,
acknowledging that “[i]t is because Student X has been able to achieve in school, possibly in part
because of this remediation, that she is not eligible for special education”) (emphasis added).
251. See Hensel, supra note 150, at 1174-77.
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educational performance in some negative respect in order to trigger
the need for the supports and services in the first instance.252
Equally problematic are those jurisdictions that categorically
exclude students who are performing adequately in the classroom
from eligibility under the IDEA. Although the statute and regulations
do not contain qualifying language about the degree of impact a child
must show for eligibility, many courts and hearing officers have
required children to demonstrate a “significant” or “substantial”
negative impact on educational performance in order to establish
coverage under the IDEA.253 For these decision makers, any evidence
of passing grades, success on statewide assessments, or performance
at or above grade level can be sufficient to defeat a claim whether or
not the student shows that it is significantly more difficult to achieve
that success because of slow reading time, concentration difficulties,
or similar limitations.254
Notably, some scholars have criticized this approach as
inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the IDEA, just as in the ADA
context.255 Many jurisdictions agree and award eligibility when the
child’s impairment makes performance more difficult in any material
aspect, or where performance would be enhanced or improved with
the addition of supports and services.256 In those jurisdictions that
252. See id. at 1172-73. Interestingly, in many of these cases, the child has received services because
he has been found eligible under the Rehabilitation Act. Id. The denial of eligibility because of the
success of mitigating measures conflicts with an opinion letter issued by the Office of Special Education
Programs (OSEP). OSEP directs eligibility teams to consider the supports and services provided to the
child who is passing from grade to grade because “the child’s current educational achievement [may]
reflect[] the service augmentation [and] not what the child’s achievement would be without such help.”
In re Pawlisch, 24 IDELR 949, 961 (OSEP 1996).
253. See Weber, supra note 241, at 103–09 (detailing case law).
254. See, e.g., id.; Robert A. Garda, Jr., Who is Eligible Under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Improvement Act?, 35 J. LAW & EDUC. 291, 311–15 (2006); Hensel, supra note 15050, at
1177 (“[C]ourts and hearing officers regularly conclude that any child capable of academic success
cannot establish the requisite need for services under the statute” even when the child must work
“significantly harder than a typical student in order to achieve comparable success.”).
255. See, e.g., Hensel, supra note 150 at 1161–62; Weber, supra note 241, at 121.
256. See, e.g., Johnson v. Metro Davidson County Sch. Sys., 108 F. Supp. 2d 906, 918–19 (M.D.
Tenn. 2000) (overruling ALJ’s determination that child’s “reasonable progress in school” negated her
ability to show her impairment adversely affected her educational performance where she was
repeatedly expelled from school while in a regular learning environment); Dighton Rehoboth Regional
Sch. Dist., 45 IDELR 146 (concluding student could establish an adverse effect on educational
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adhere to the contrary approach, however, the potential for treating
similarly situated students differently under the two statutes remains.
Students who are capable of meaningful academic performance may
be automatically excluded from protection under IDEA while
potentially eligible for accommodations under the Rehabilitation Act
despite the statutes’ reliance on the same definition of learning
disabilities.
This disconnect is likely to grow as schools increasingly shift to a
Response to Intervention model (RTI) of identifying learning
disabilities under the IDEA.257 As discussed earlier, the discrepancy
model has historically been the preferred method of identifying
learning disabilities.258 This approach will diagnose learning
disabilities when a high achieving student demonstrates a discrepancy
between his intellectual ability and his academic performance, even if
his overall performance is impressive.259 In contrast, the RTI method
diagnoses learning disabilities by presenting students performing
poorly in the classroom with a series of teaching interventions to
redress academic deficiencies. If the student fails to respond to
several such interventions, a learning disability is identified as the
likely source, and eligibility under the IDEA follows.260 As is
immediately apparent, this approach will never identify the student
performing adequately in the classroom as eligible under the
IDEA.261
During her testimony to the Senate Committee on Health,
Education, Labor and Pensions, Sue Gamm used the conflict between
expanded 504 eligibility standards and the RTI method of identifying
learning disabilities to argue against the bill’s passage:
performance despite receiving good grades where student was unable to attend school and received
tutoring at home).
257. See Hensel, supra note 150, at 1161 (explaining the Response to Intervention methodology).
258. See sources cited supra note 158.
259. See Hensel, supra note 150, at 1160.
260. See, e.g., Weber, supra note 241, at 127–29 (describing RTI model of identifying learning
disabilities).
261. See, e.g., Nancy Mather & Nadeen Kaufman, Introduction to the Special Issue, Part Two: It’s
About the “What,” the “How Well,” and the “Why,” 43 PSYCHOL. IN THE SCH. 829, 831 (2006) (noting
that the RTI method does not recognize that “[i]ntelligent people can have SLD”).
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With a new definition for substantial limitation in favor of a
broad scope of protection, a valid question remains regarding the
extent to which students with poor academic performance who
have a reading impairment (which is likely to be most of them
unless school officials find the student lacked appropriate
instruction) will be eligible for legal protection and mandated
accommodations under Section 504. Furthermore, with H.R.
3195’s mandate to consider the substantial limitation
requirement without regard to mitigating measures, such as early
intervention services or medication, school districts could be
required to superimpose Section 504 evaluation, planning and
procedural safeguards requirements upon the Response to
Intervention model. Such a scheme is the antitheses to that
envisioned by the 2004 IDEA Reauthorization and Rethinking
Learning Disabilities:
Given that the underlying causes of most early reading
difficulties are similar for children regardless of whether they are
currently served in special or compensatory education programs,
we argue that the most valid and efficient way to deliver this
early intervention in reading is through regular education. This
approach allows limited funds to be targeted at intervention
rather than expensive eligibility determination practices.262

It may be that treating learning disabilities differently under the
two statutes is justified given that eligibility under the IDEA allocates
funding to elementary and secondary schools and provides significant
due process protections to students. It strains common sense,
however, to say that a student is substantially limited in learning for
purposes of § 504 but cannot establish a learning disability in the
same academic setting for purposes of the IDEA. It would seem that
students, educators, and administrators all would benefit from a more
262. Gamm Testimony, supra note 213, at *6 (emphasis added). Cf. Weber, supra note 238, at 133–43
(discussing difficulty of using RTI to identify learning disabilities).
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consistent, seamless treatment of learning disabilities rather than a
shifting array of eligibility standards for similarly situated students. It
remains to be seen how elementary and secondary schools will
respond to this new challenge.
CONCLUSION
The ADAAA offers hope to the millions of people in the United
States who have experienced physical or mental disabilities during
their lifetime. The ADAAA rejects courts’ narrow approach to
eligibility under the statute and restores Congress’ original intent to
provide broad legal protection from disability discrimination in
society. There is no question that the changes occasioned by the new
legislation will pose challenges to schools and universities in the
future. In many respects, however, these challenges will be tied to the
fundamental mission of these institutions—providing education to
enable all students, impaired or otherwise, to reach their human
potential.
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